Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-c9gpj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-12T21:18:39.912Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

FOUR - Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2011

By
Gordon C. Rausser  and
Gérard Roland
Edited by
Kym Anderson
Gordon C. Rausser
Affiliation:
University of California in Berkeley
Gérard Roland
Affiliation:
University of California in Berkeley
Kym Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Adelaide
Get access

Summary

In any public policy-making process, political and economic forces are at play in resolving the strategic interactions among the public and special interests. A schematic representation of the policy-making process reflecting these forces is represented in Figure 4.1. Historically, the right-hand box has been the domain of political science, whereas the left-hand box has been the domain of economics. At the top of the right box, particular governance structures set the constitutional design establishing voting rules, the rule of law, property rights, laws governing exchange, and more generally the rules by which rules are made. Governance structures also determine the nature and scope of the political feedback mechanisms from groups affected by public policies. In its most expansive representation, any causal analysis of constitutional rules investigates the implications of alternative legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, as well as various degrees of political, civil, and economic freedoms. In other words, governance structures set the boundaries for the political-economic link. Over the course of the last few decades, economists have begun to make significant theoretical and empirical advancements in analyzing the link between governance structures, political economics, and the selection of actual policies.

Political-economic analysis seeks to explain the selection and implementation of public policies. This link in the policy-making process endogenizes the instrument settings as a function of governmental bureaucracy and the actions of stakeholders. Interest groups, as agents representing stakeholders, are the units of analysis.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions , pp. 105 - 125
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alesina, A. (1988), “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters,”American Economic Review 78(4): 796–805.Google Scholar
Allcott, H., Lederman, D. and Lopez, R. (2006), “Political Institutions, Inequality, and Agricultural Growth: The Public Expenditure Connection,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3902, April.
Anderson, K. (1995), “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries,”Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(2): 401–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, K. and Valenzuela, E. (2008), “Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 1955 to 2007,” core database at http://www.worldbank.org/agdisrtortions
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1998), “Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis,”American Economic Review 88(1): 139–56.Google Scholar
Cremer, J. and Palfrey, T.R. (2000), “Federal Mandates by Popular Demand,”Journal of Political Economy 108: 905–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gorter, H. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2002), “Political Economy of Agricultural Policy”, Ch. 36 in Gardner, B.L. and Rausser, G.C. (eds.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1996), “Measuring Inequality: A New Data-Base,”World Bank Economic Review 10(3): 565–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1998), “New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth,”Journal of Development Economics 57: 249–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gardner, B.L. (1987), “Causes of US Farm Commodity Programs”, Journal of Political Economy 95(2): 290–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1994), “Protection for Sale,”American Economic Review 84: 833–50.Google Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1995), “Trade Wars and Trade Talks,”Journal of Political Economy 103: 675–708.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2001), Special Interest Politics, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Lee, D.R. and Rausser, G.C. (1992), “The Structure of Research and Transfer Policies in International Agriculture: Evidence and Implications,” Occasional Paper, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J.W. (1987), “Balanced-budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition,”Public Choice 52: 273–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N. (2001), “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives,”American Economic Review 91(1): 225–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Madison, J. (1898), Federalist Paper No. 10. In E. H. Scott (ed.) The Federalist and Other Constitutional Papers, Chicago: Scott, Forsman.Google Scholar
Myerson, R.B. (1993), “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems,”American Political Science Review 87(4): 856–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D.C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Osborne, M.J. and Slivinski, A. (1996), “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Canditates,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 65–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1999), “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians,”European Economic Review 43 (4–6): 699–735.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,”Journal of Political Economy 108: 1121–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and G. Tabellini, (2007), “Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies,”Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2: 155–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rausser, G.C. (1982), “Political Economic Markets: PERTs and PESTs in Food and Agriculture,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64: 821–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rausser, G.C. (1992), “Predatory Versus Productive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies,”Journal of Economic Perspectives 6(3): 133–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rausser, G.C. (2007), “Second Stage: Political Economy Analysis of Distortion Patterns,” Presentation at the World Bank's Political Economy of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives conference, Portland OR, July 2007.
Rausser, G.C. and Goodhue, R. (2002), “Public Policy: Its Many Analytical Dimensions,” in Gardner, B.L. and Rausser, G.C. (eds.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Rausser, G.C., Swinnen, J.F.M. and Zusman, P. (2010), Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).Google Scholar
Swinnen, J.F.M., Gorter, H., and Banerjee, A. (2000), ”Political Economy of Public Research Investment and Commodity Policies in Agriculture: an Empirical Study,”Agricultural Economics 22(2): 111–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×