Meno offers his third definition of virtue at 77b2–5:

Socrates' first move is to substitute the word ‘good’ (agathos) for ‘fine’ (kalos). Although he does this very swiftly, the move is not as straightforward as it is made to sound. The word kalos can mean ‘beautiful’, and is commonly applied to physical objects. But it can also apply to actions or characters in the sense of ‘noble’. (I have used the translation ‘fine’ in an attempt to cover both senses.) In Plato's works, the concept of the agathon is very closely connected with whatever is beneficial or useful – prima facie a different sense from that of kalon. Nevertheless, agathon and kalon draw very close together in other dialogues, and it is interesting that here Meno accepts the substitution without any complaint. This allows Socrates to proceed straight to the business of refutation, which he does by examining each of its two components in turn: that virtue involves (1) the desire for good things and (2) the ability to acquire them.

DESIRE AND THE GOOD (77b–78b)

The underlying assumption of this section is that, if something is to act as a mark of the virtuous, it cannot be common to all people, because not everyone is virtuous.