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20 - Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures

from Part V - Methodological and Philosophical Issues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 April 2017

Cian Dorr
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University, USA
Frank Arntzenius
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, University College, Oxford, UK
Khalil Chamcham
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Joseph Silk
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
John D. Barrow
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Simon Saunders
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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