3 - Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Summary
In the previous chapter, we discussed the criticism of skepticism as a view that blocks the endorsement of any view. We parried this attack by arguing that it rests on the false assumption that views are chosen by mere decisions, whereas beliefs are largely given. This objection meets with a standard protest: the concern is not with belief but rather with rational belief. The received assumption is that irrational belief is forbidden and rational belief is obligatory and that skepticism denies that some beliefs are rational. What belief is rational? They say, for example, that the belief in tomorrow's sunrise is rational. Even if this were true, we have to admit that we do not choose to believe that; rather, we believe it is the result of some highly complex psychological processes that take us back to our childhood. In our scientific culture, we do not believe as adults in what we believed in as children. How come? What are the processes that we undergo as we forge or rather modify our views of the world? Under what conditions does the belief arise that a given statement is true? These are the questions that we discuss in this chapter.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Philosophy from a Skeptical Perspective , pp. 60 - 85Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008