Rudner, Richard. 1953. “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.” Philosophy of Science. One of the earliest articulations of the argument from inductive risk for values in science.Google Scholar

Jeffrey, Richard C. 1956. “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses,” Philosophy of Science. Jeffrey replies to Rudner by arguing that scientists should avoid accepting and rejecting hypotheses and should only assign them probabilities.Google Scholar

Douglas, Heather. 2000. “Inductive Risk and Values in Science,” Philosophy of Science. The paper that brought the Rudner/Jeffrey debate back into philosophy of science. Douglas argues, pace Jeffrey, that value judgments need to be made prior to hypothesis acceptance and rejection.Google Scholar

Steel, Daniel. 2015. “Acceptance, Values, and Probability,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. Argues that on the right understanding of the role that credences play in science, we ought to think of scientists accepting or rejecting probability assignments, rather than simply coming to have them. On this view, Steel argues, acceptance and rejection of a probability assignment itself involves inductive risk.Google Scholar

Longino, Helen. 1995. “Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy,” in Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. Challenges the distinction, often appealed to in the science and values literature, between epistemic and non-epistemic values.Google Scholar

Parker, Wendy and Winsberg, Eric. 2017. “Values and Evidence: How models Make a Difference,” European Journal for Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar