Introduction

So far this book has considered philosophical ideas of values, morality, aesthetics, order and rules and how they relate to criminological concern. This chapter explores a positive way forward centred on the concept of respect. The meaning of ‘respect’ has been a concern for moral philosophy for some time (for example Darwall, 1977; Dworkin, 1977; Hill, 2000; Bagnoli, 2007; Carter, 2011). Much of this work draws, at least in part, on the writings of Immanuel Kant centred on the categorical imperative (see Chapter Three) and the notion of human dignity, that ‘respect for the moral law entails treating persons (oneself included) always as ends in themselves and never simply as means’ (Darwall, 1977: 36). In effect, human dignity prescribes that people should never be considered means to an end. According to Thomas Hill (2000: 69), a Kantian perspective is that ‘human beings are to be regarded as worthy of respect as human beings, regardless of how their values differ and whether or not we disapprove of what they do’. In this way respect is due to all persons, regardless of who they are. Such egalitarianism has been problematic for some. For instance, according to Stephen Darwall (1977: 37):

This chapter unpicks the meaning of respect and whether respect for all can work alongside respect having to be earned. Drawing on Kantian philosophy, and work by Stephen Darwall (1977) and Thomas Hill (2000) in particular, two types of respect are outlined. The political use of the language of respect is then considered in the context of work on mutuality. Respect for self is regarded as just as important as respect for others. The chapter also considers the place of deference. It is concluded that if those with power in society want respect, they must simply first show respect, but not demand it in return. This is not how politicians have regarded respect, and such an approach would be a challenge for criminal justice agencies.