Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Nominalism as demonic doctrine
- 2 Logic, philosophy and the special sciences
- 3 Continuity and the problem of universals
- 4 Continuity and meaning: Peirce's pragmatic maxim
- 5 Logical foundations of Peirce's pragmatic maxim
- 6 Experience and its role in inquiry
- 7 Inquiry as self-corrective
- 8 Theories of truth: Peirce versus the nominalists
- 9 Order out of chaos: Peirce's evolutionary cosmology
- 10 A universe of chance: foundations of Peirce's indeterminism
- 11 From inquiry to ethics: the pursuit of truth as moral ideal
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Inquiry as self-corrective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 April 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- 1 Nominalism as demonic doctrine
- 2 Logic, philosophy and the special sciences
- 3 Continuity and the problem of universals
- 4 Continuity and meaning: Peirce's pragmatic maxim
- 5 Logical foundations of Peirce's pragmatic maxim
- 6 Experience and its role in inquiry
- 7 Inquiry as self-corrective
- 8 Theories of truth: Peirce versus the nominalists
- 9 Order out of chaos: Peirce's evolutionary cosmology
- 10 A universe of chance: foundations of Peirce's indeterminism
- 11 From inquiry to ethics: the pursuit of truth as moral ideal
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The discussion of perceptual judgements in Chapter 6 was launched by the nominalist's objection that, on Peirce's view, the laws implied by symbols are unverifiable, given that their testable consequences outstrip the evidence available to inquirers to confirm them. If this is the case, the nominalist is in a strong position to argue that, even if symbols cannot be altogether eliminated from rational inquiry, they should be viewed as nothing more than tools that enable inquirers to predict and control experience, and not as objective representations of laws operative in the world, as Peirce takes them to be. Having explained how Peirce thinks experience gives rise to symbolic representations (in the form of perceptual judgements) I turn, in this chapter, to his theory of inquiry – his account of the methods by which the truth or falsehood of symbols is determined.
PEIRCE'S VIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
Peirce's theory of inquiry is aimed at providing a method that will guide inquirers to truth, no matter what beliefs they start out with. This conception of what rational inquiry requires by way of a method is based on the account of symbols and perceptual judgements given in earlier chapters.
Peirce views inquiry as the pursuit of truth. Truth, for him, is primarily a property of symbols and derivatively of beliefs, the latter being judgements concerning the truth of symbols.
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- Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism , pp. 130 - 156Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011