The nebulous character of patron–client relations makes it difficult to assess their policy consequences. Their pervasiveness is quite apparent, but, in a political system not easily opened to outside scrutiny, exploring their political implications is challenging. This chapter examines the Brezhnev policy program and investigates how network and non-network members reacted to it. That program, touching upon all important sectors and interests, was composed of numerous specific “planks” or issues about which most prominent officials spoke in public addresses. By tracing the evolution of this policy program, and by examining the degree to which officials supported its policies, we tap into one of the few sources of information on governance during the Brezhnev years. While the analyses confirm the importance of network and coalition building to governance, the relationship that is revealed is complex.

In a mono-party system where basic political differences are not acknowledged, patronage bridges the variable interests of a heterogeneous elite. Patronage ties impact upon the policy process because they “constrain” the behavior of clients and protégés. Those who are politically subordinate to the network patron are under pressure to support that patron and his broad policy program. We have already seen the potential for rapid upward and downward mobility connected with supportive or unsupportive subordinates. Within the centralized, hierarchical Soviet political setting, there are both positive and negative incentives for clients to support the initiatives of their patron.