In chapter 13, Graham Oppy takes on the challenge of making sense of the infinite utility that plays a central role in the canonical version of Pascal’s Wager. Oppy runs through a catalogue of difficulties. Can humans meaningfully assign infinite utility as the outcome of wagering for God? Can naïve infinite decision theory overcome the mixed-strategies objection? Oppy then turns to non-standard mathematical representations of infinity in the Wager, such as offered by Alan Hájek. He argues that since these approaches countenance infinite utilities, they should also permit infinitesimal probabilities. The decision about whether to wager then turns on the precise combination of the probability and utility values. The last part of Oppy’s chapter is a critique of the approach taken by Paul Bartha. Bartha’s “relative utilities” avoid many of the problems that plague naïve infinite decision theory. However, Oppy observes that Bartha’s approach canvasses too limited a range of possible deities, requires a strong equilibrium requirement that has no independent justification, and cannot handle infinitesimal probabilities. He concludes that there is as yet no satisfactory treatment of infinite utility.