Aczel, Peter (1987) Lectures on Nonwellfounded Sets. Stanford, CA, CSLI Lecture Notes, no. 9.Google Scholar

Anand, Paul (1993) Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Aristotle, (1970) Physics, trans. Charlton, W.. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Asher, Nicholas M. and Kamp, Johan A. W. (1986) “The knower's paradox and representational theories of the attitudes.” In Halpern, J. (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Morgan Kaufman, New York, pp. 131–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York.Google Scholar

Bar-Hillel, Maya and Margalit, Avishai (1972) “Newcomb's paradox revisited.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23: 295–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bar-Hillel, Maya, and Margalit, Avishai (1983) “Expecting the unexpected.” Philosophia 13: 263–88.Google Scholar

Bar-Hillel, Maya, and Margalit, Avishai (1985) “Gideon's paradox – a paradox of rationality.” Synthese 63: 139–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bartlett, Steven J. (1992) Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. North-Holland, Amsterdam and London.Google Scholar

Barwise, Jon and Etchemendy, John (1987) The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.Google Scholar

Benacerraf, Paul (1962) “Tasks, super-tasks, and the modern Eleatics.” Journal of Philosophy 59: 765–84. Reprinted in Salmon (1970), pp. 103–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Benditt, T. M. and Ross, David J. (1976) “Newcomb's paradox.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 161–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bernadete, J. (1964) Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Black, Max (1937) “Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis.” Philosophy of Science 4: 427–55. Reprinted in his Language and Philosophy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1949, pp. 25–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joe (2004) “Fitch's paradox of knowability.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitch-paradox/.Google Scholar

Burge, Tyler (1978) “Buridan and epistemic paradox.” Philosophical Studies 34: 21–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Burge, Tyler (1979) “Semantical paradox.” Journal of Philosophy 76: 169–98. Reprinted in Martin (1984), pp. 83–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Burge, Tyler (1984) “Epistemic paradox.” Journal of Philosophy 81: 5–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Buridan, JohnSophismata. In Hughes (1982).

Campbell, Richmond and Lanning, Sowden (eds.) (1985) Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver.

Cargile, J. (1965) “The sorites paradox.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20: 193–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copeland, J. (1994) “On vague identity, fuzzy objects and fractal boundaries.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 33: 83–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copi, Irving M. (1971) The Theory of Logical Types. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Google Scholar

Dowden, Bradley (2007) “Liar paradox.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: www.iep.utm.edu/p/par-liar.htm.

Dummett, Michael (1975) “Wang's paradox.” Synthese 30: 301–24. Reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas. Duckworth, London. 1978, pp. 248–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Edgington, Dorothy (1992) “Validity, uncertainty and vagueness.” Analysis 52.4: 193–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Edwards, Paul (1967) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols. Collier-Macmillan and Free Press, New York.Google Scholar

Evans, Gareth (1978) “Can there be vague objects?”Analysis 38: 208. Reprinted in his Collected Papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1985, pp. 176–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fine, Kit (1975) “Vagueness, truth and logic.” Synthese 30: 265–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fitch, F. (1952) Symbolic Logic. Ronald Press Company, New York.Google Scholar

Fitch, F. (1963) “A logical analysis of some value concepts.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 28: 135–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Forrester, James William (1984) “Gentle murder and the adverbial Samaritan.” Journal of Philosophy 81: 193–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Foster, John (1983) “Induction, explanation and natural necessity.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83: 87–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Foster, Marguerite and Martin, Michael L. (eds.) (1966) Probability, Confirmation and Simplicity. Odyssey Press, New York.

Gaifman, Haim (1983) “Paradoxes of infinity and self-application, I.” Erkenntnis 20: 131–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gale, Richard M. (ed.) (1968) The Philosophy of Time. Macmillan, London.CrossRef

Gensler, Harry J. (1986) “A Kantian argument against abortion.” Philosophical Studies 49: 83–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gibbard, A. and Harper, W. L. (1978) “Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility.” In Hooker, C. A., Leach, J. J., and McClennon, E. F. (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, vol. I. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 125–62. Reprinted (abridged) in Campbell and Sowden (1985), pp. 133–58.Google Scholar

Glanzberg, M. (2003) “Minimalism and paradoxes.” Synthese 135: 13–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Glanzberg, M. (2004) “Truth, reflection, and hierarchies.” Synthese 142: 289–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goguen, J. A. (1969) “The logic of inexact concepts.” Synthese 19: 325–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goldstein, Laurence (1992) “‘This statement is not true’ is not true.” Analysis 52.1: 1–5.Google Scholar

Goodman, Nelson (1955) Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; 2nd edn, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN, 1965.Google Scholar

Goodman, Nelson (1978) Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett, Indianapolis, IN.Google Scholar

Gowans, Christopher W. (ed.) (1987) Moral Dilemmas, Oxford University Press, New York.

Graff-Fara, D. G. (2000). “Shifting sands: an interest-relative theory of vagueness.” Philosophical Topics 28: 45–81. Originally published under the name “Delia Graff.”CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Grünbaum, Adolf (1967) Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT.Google Scholar

Gupta, Anil (1982) “Truth and paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 11: 1–60. Reprinted in Martin (1984), pp. 175–235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Haack, Susan (1978) The Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hájek, Alan (2005). “The Cable Guy paradox.” Analysis 65: 112–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hazen, Allen (1987) “Contra Buridanum.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17: 875–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hempel, Carl (1945) Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Free Press, New York, reprinted 1965. The material on the Ravens Paradox is reprinted from Mind 54: 1–26, 97–121 (1945).Google Scholar

Herzberger, Hans A. (1970) “Paradoxes of grounding in semantics.” Journal of Philosophy 67: 145–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hinkfuss, Ian (1991) “Pro Buridano; contra Hazenum.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21.3: 389–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hollis, Martin and Sugden, Robert (1993) “Rationality in action.” Mind 103: 1–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Horn, L. R. (1989) A Natural History of Negation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar

Huggett, Nick (2004) “Zeno's paradoxes.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/.

Hughes, G. E. (ed. and trans.) (1982) John Buridan on Self-Reference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York. This work by Buridan was originally entitled Sophismata.

Hume, David (2000 [1738]) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton, David Fate and Norton, Mary J.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hyde, Dominic (1994) “Why higher-order vagueness is a pseudo-problem.” Mind 103: 35–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hyde, Dominic (2005) “Sorites paradox.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/.

Jackson, Frank (1975) “Grue.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 113–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Janaway, Christopher (1989) “Knowing about surprises: a supposed antinomy revisited.” Mind 98: 391–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Jeffrey, Richard C. (1965) The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill, New York.Google Scholar

Jørgensen, Jørgen (1953) “Some reflections on reflexivity.” Mind 62: 289–300. Reprinted in Bartlett (1992), pp. 63–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kamp, Hans (1975). “Two theories about adjectives.” In Keenan, E. (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 123–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kamp, Hans (1981) “The paradox of the heap.” In Monnich, U. (ed.), Aspects of Philosophical Logic. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 225–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kavka, Gregory (1987) Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Klement, Kevin (2006) “Russell's paradox.” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: www.iep.utm.edu/p/par-russ.htm.

Koons, Robert (1992) Paradoxes of Rationality. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kripke, Saul (1975) “Outline of a theory of truth.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 690–716. Reprinted in Martin (1984), pp. 53–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kripke, Saul (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Kuhn, Steven (2007): “Prisoner's dilemma.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.Google Scholar

Kyburg, Henry (1961) Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT.Google Scholar

Levi, Isaac (1967) Gambling with Truth. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Google Scholar

Lewis, David (1979) “Prisoner's Dilemma is a Newcomb problem.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8: 235–40. Reprinted in Campbell and Sowden (1985), pp. 251–5.Google Scholar

Lewis, David (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, Malden, MA.Google Scholar

Lewis, David (1988) “Vague identity: Evans misunderstood.” Analysis 48: 128–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ludwig, K. and Ray, G. (2002). “Vagueness and the sorites paradox.” Philosophical Perspectives 16: 419–61.Google Scholar

McConnell, Terrance (2006) “Moral dilemmas.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/moral-dilemmas/.

Mackie, J. L. (1973) Truth, Probability and Paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Mackie, J. L. (1977) “Newcomb's paradox and the direction of causation.” Canadian Philosophical Review 7: 213–25. Reprinted in his Collected Papers II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

MacFarlane, John (2007). “Fuzzy epistemicism.” Available at: http://johnmacfarlane.net/fuzzy-epistemicism.pdf.

Makinson, D. C. (1965) “The paradox of the preface.” Analysis 25: 205–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1980) “Moral dilemmas and consistency.” Journal of Philosophy 77: 121–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Martin, Robert L. (ed.) (1984) Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Mele, Alfred R. and Smith, M. P. (1988) “The new paradox of the stone.” Faith and Philosophy 5: 283–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Mellor, D. H. (1971) The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.Google Scholar

Montague, Richard and Kaplan, David (1960) “A paradox regained.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1: 79–90. Reprinted in Richmond Thomason (ed.), Formal Philosophy. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1974, pp. 271–85.Google Scholar

Nozick, R. (1969) “Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice.” In Rescher, Nicholas (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel, Dordrecht. Abridged version reprinted in Campbell and Sowden (1985), pp. 107–33.Google Scholar

Nozick, R. (1993) The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.Google Scholar

Parfit, Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Peacocke, C. A. B. (1981) “Are vague predicates incoherent?” Synthese 46: 121–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Peirce, C. (1935) The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Hartshorne, Charles and Weiss, Paul, 8 vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar

Priest, Graham (1986) “Contradiction, belief and rationality.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 99–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Priest, Graham (1987) In Contradiction. Nijhof, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Priest, Graham (1993) “Can contradictions be true?” Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67: 35–54.Google Scholar

Priest, Graham (1994) “The structure of the paradoxes of self-reference.” Mind 103: 25–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Priest, Graham (1999) “On a version of one of Zeno's paradoxes.” Analysis 59: 1–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Priest, Graham (2004) “Dialetheism.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/.

Priest, Graham, Routley, Richard and Norman, Jean (eds.) (1989) Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the InconsistentPhilosophia Verlag, Munich.

Priest, Graham, Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, B. (eds.) (2004) New Essays on the Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRef

Prior, Arthur N. (1961) “On a family of paradoxes.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2: 16–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Quine, Willard van O. (1953) “On a so-called paradox.” Mind 62: 65–7. Reprinted in Quine (1966), pp. 19–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Quine, Willard van O. (1966) Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York, Random House. (The title essay is on pp. 1–18.)Google Scholar

Raffman, D. (1994). “Vagueness without paradox.” Philosophical Review 103: 41–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ramsey, Frank P. (1925) “The foundations of mathematics.” Reprinted in Mellor, D. H. (ed.), Foundations. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1978, pp. 152–212.Google Scholar

Ramsey, Frank P. (1926) “Truth and probability.” Reprinted in Mellor, D. H. (ed.), Foundations. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1978, pp. 58–100.

Rashdall, Hastings (1907) The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. II. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Rescher, N. (2001) Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Open Court, Chicago.Google Scholar

Rescher, N. and Brandom, R. (1980) The Logic of Inconsistency. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Russell, Bertrand (1903) The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.Google Scholar

Russell, Bertrand (1908) “Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types.” American Journal of Mathematics 30: 222–62. Reprinted in R. C. Marsh (ed.), Logic and Knowledge. Allen and Unwin, London. 1956, pp. 59–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Russell, Bertrand (1936) “The limits of empiricism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 36: 131–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Russell, Bertrand and Whitehead, Alfred North (1910–13) Principia Mathematica, 3 vols. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar

Sainsbury, R. M. and Timothy, Williamson (1995) “Sorites.” In Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Salmon, Nathan U. (1982) Reference and Essence. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Salmon, Wesley C. (1970) Zeno's Paradoxes. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN.Google Scholar

Salmon, Wesley C. (1980) Space, Time and Motion: A Philosophical Introduction, 2nd edn. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Google Scholar

Sanford, David (1975) “Borderline logic.” American Philosophical Quarterly 12: 29–39.Google Scholar

Sanford, David (1976) “Competing semantics of vagueness: many values versus super-truth.” Synthese 33: 195–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Savage, C. Wade (1967) “The paradox of the stone.” Philosophical Review 76: 74–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Schiffer, Stephen (2003) The Things We Mean. Clarendon Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Schlesinger, G. (1974a) Confirmation and Confirmability. Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar

Schlesinger, G. (1974b) “The unpredictability of free choice.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 209–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Schrader, David E. (1979) “A solution to the stone paradox.” Synthese 42: 255–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Scriven, Michael (1951) “Paradoxical announcements.” Mind 60: 403–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Selton, Reinhard (1978) “The chain store paradox.” Theory and Decision 9: 127–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Skyrms, Brian (1982) “Intensional aspects of semantical self-reference.” In Martin (1984), pp. 119–31.

Smilansky, Saul (2007) Ten Moral Paradoxes. Blackwell, Malden, MA.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Smiley, Timothy (1993) “Can contradictions be true?”Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67: 17–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Smith, Nicholas J. J. (2006) “Semantic regularity and the Liar paradox.” The Monist 89: 178–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (1982) “Recalcitrant variations of the prediction paradox.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 355–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (1988) Blindspots. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (2001) Vagueness and Contradiction. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (2003) A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (2006a) “Vagueness.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/.Google Scholar

Sorensen, Roy A. (2006b) “Epistemic paradoxes.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/.Google Scholar

Stephanou, Ioannis (1994) “The meaning of the logical constants and the justification of logical laws.” University of London PhD thesis.

Storer, Thomas (1961) “MINIAC: world's smallest electronic brain.” Analysis 22: 151–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Strawson, Peter (1950) “On referring.” Mind 59: 269–86. Reprinted in his Logico-Linguistic Papers. Methuen, London. 1971, pp. 1–27.Google Scholar

Tarski, Alfred (1944) “The semantic conception of truth: and the foundations of semantics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4: 341–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tarski, Alfred (1956 [1937]) “The concept of truth in formalized languages.” In his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Clarendon Press, New York, pp. 152–278; first published in Polish in 1933.Google Scholar

Tarski, Alfred (1969) “Truth and proof.” Scientific American 194: 63–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Thomason, Richmond H. (1970) Symbolic Logic: An Introduction. Macmillan, Toronto.Google Scholar

Thomson, James F. (1954) “Tasks and super-tasks.” Analysis 15: 1–13. Reprinted in Gale (1968), pp. 406–21, and in Salmon (1970), pp. 89–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tye, Michael (1990) “Vague objects.” Mind 99: 535–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Tye, Michael (1994a) “Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness.” In Tomberlin, James (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language. Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA.Google Scholar

Tye, Michael (1994b) “Why the vague need not be higher-order vague.” Mind 103: 43–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Unger, Peter (1979a) “There are no ordinary things.” Synthese 41: 117–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Unger, Peter (1979b) “I do not exist.” In MacDonald, Graham (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer. Macmillan, London, pp. 235–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fraassen, B. (1966) “Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.” Journal of Philosophy 53: 481–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fraassen, B. (1968) “Presupposition, implication and self-reference.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 136–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Heijenoort, John (1967) “Logical paradoxes.” In Edwards (1967), vol. V, pp. 44–51.

Vickers, James (2006) “The problem of induction.” In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/.

Vlastos, Gregory (1967) “Zeno of Elea.” In Edwards (1967), vol. VIII, pp. 369–79.

Wiggins, David (1986) “On singling out an object determinately.” In Pettit, Philip and McDowell, John (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 169–80.Google Scholar

Williams, Bernard (1966) “Ethical consistency.” Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40: 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Williamson, Timothy (1992a) “Inexact knowledge.” Mind 101: 218–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Williamson, Timothy (1992b) “Vagueness and ignorance.” Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66: 145–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Williamson, Timothy (1994) Vagueness. Routledge, London.Google Scholar

Williamson, Timothy (1999) “On the structure of higher-order vagueness.” Mind 108: 127–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Williamson, Timothy (2003) “Vagueness in reality.” In Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. W. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 690–715.Google Scholar

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Wright, Crispin (1975) “On the coherence of vague predicates.” Synthese 30: 325–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, Crispin (1987) “Further reflections on the sorites paradox.” Philosophical Topics 15: 227–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, Crispin (1992) “Is higher order vagueness coherent?”Analysis 53.3: 129–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, Crispin (1995) “The epistemic conception of vagueness.” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Supplement) 33: 133–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, Crispin (2001) “On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism.” Mind 110: 45–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Wright, Crispin and Aidan, Sudbury (1977) “The paradox of the unexpected examination.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 41–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Zadeh, L. A. (1965) “Fuzzy sets.” Information and Control 8: 338–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar