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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 October 2021

Zach Weber
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University of Otago, New Zealand
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  • Bibliography
  • Zach Weber, University of Otago, New Zealand
  • Book: Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics
  • Online publication: 08 October 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.017
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  • Bibliography
  • Zach Weber, University of Otago, New Zealand
  • Book: Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics
  • Online publication: 08 October 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.017
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bibliography
  • Zach Weber, University of Otago, New Zealand
  • Book: Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics
  • Online publication: 08 October 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.017
Available formats
×