This collection reprints almost all my previously published papers in philosophical logic, except for those that were previously reprinted in another collection, Philosophical Papers. Still omitted are (1) two papers in deontic logic; (2) a paper on counterfactual logic, which is superseded by proofs later published in my book Counterfactuals; and (3) two papers on immodest inductive methods, the first of them completely mistaken and the second one concerned with loose ends left over when the first was rebutted. I have taken the opportunity to correct typographical and editorial errors. But I have left the philosophical content as it originally was, rather than trying to rewrite the papers as I would write them today. A very few afterthoughts have been noted in new footnotes.

The first four papers have to do with the project of transplanting the methods of formal semantics from artificial formalized languages to natural languages, or to formalized approximations thereof. ‘Index, Context, and Content’ is a meta-theoretical paper, arguing that some supposedly competing formulations are no more than notational variants. The other three study particular constructions. ‘Adverbs of Quantification’ examines a neglected part of the quantificational apparatus of ordinary English: sentential adverbs like ‘always’, sometimes, ‘often’, et al. (I first became interested in these adverbs as a means to making my own technical writing more concise. Only afterward did it occur to me that they afforded a treatment of a class of problematic sentences in which it seemed that there was no satisfactory way to assign relative scopes to quantifier phrases.)