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5 - Desire as belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 December 2009

David Lewis
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Summary

THE ANTI-HUMEAN CHALLENGE

A Humean thesis about motivation says that we are moved entirely by desire: we are disposed to do what will serve our desires according to our beliefs. If there were no desires to serve, we would never be moved more to do one thing than another. Whatever might happen then would be entirely unmotivated. Here I shall uphold Humeanism against one sort of opponent.

Our anti-Humean challenges us with this case. The Department must choose between two candidates for a job, Meane and Neiss. Neiss is your old friend, affable, sensible, fair-minded, co-operative, moderate,. … Meane is quite the opposite. But it is clear that Meane is just a little bit better at philosophy. Gritting your teeth and defying all desire, you vote for Meane, because you believe that Meane getting the job instead of Neiss would, all things considered, be good. Your belief about what's good has moved you to go against your desire to have Neiss for a colleague and to have nothing to do with Meane.

We Humeans reply that there are desires and there are desires.

Some desires, for instance your desire to have Neiss for a colleague, are warm – you feel enthusiasm, you take pleasure in the prospect of fulfilment. Other desires, for instance your desire to hire the best available candidate, are cold. Nobody ever said that only the warm desires can move us.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

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  • Desire as belief
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy
  • Online publication: 24 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625114.006
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  • Desire as belief
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy
  • Online publication: 24 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625114.006
Available formats
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  • Desire as belief
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy
  • Online publication: 24 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625114.006
Available formats
×