If one is to question the inevitability of the mark's collapse, the fourteen months between March 1920 and May 1921 are of critical importance. This period must be seen in the context of the general international slump which began in early 1920 as the restoration of trade links ended shortages in Europe, and as the British and American monetary and fiscal authorities began to take steps to settle the bills run up during the war and to end inflation by raising taxes and restricting credit. 1920/1 saw severe deflation in both countries, with prices and production slumping and unemployment sharply rising; and this deflation tended to spread to their trading partners. In Germany too, prices stopped rising, falling by around 20 per cent from a peak in March 1920 to a trough in July, and then oscillating at around thirteen to fourteen times their pre-war level until July 1921. This reflected not only the fall in import prices caused by British and American deflation, but also the recovery of the mark exchange rate and the increase in domestic production described in the previous chapter. The question is whether anything could have been done to make this ‘relative stabilisation’ last. It is clear that any attempt to restore the mark to pre-war parity on the British pattern was out of the question; a drop in output of at least 4.8 per cent and unemployment of 11.3 per cent (the effect of British deflationary policies in 1920/1) would almost certainly have been politically intolerable.