Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-9pm4c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T09:02:00.469Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2011

Gary Lawson
Affiliation:
Boston University School of Law
Geoffrey P. Miller
Affiliation:
New York University School of Law
Robert G. Natelson
Affiliation:
University of Montana School of Law
Guy I. Seidman
Affiliation:
University of Herzilya, Israel
Get access

Summary

The Necessary and Proper Clause is perplexing. Perhaps the single greatest source of congressional power, a cornerstone of the modern administrative state, a trump card authorizing federal domination over many issues of national life, a symbol, for some, of the power of governments to improve the life of their citizens – it is all these, and more. Yet its terms are anything but pellucid. What does “necessary” mean? What about “proper”? What is the relationship between these words? The Constitution itself offers little clue. The phrase emerged from the Committee of Detail without clarification. The records of the Constitutional Convention provide scant evidence as to how the framers understood the clause, and the ratifying debates are not illuminating. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, the clause appeared to have been nearly forgotten.

The odd contrast between the importance of the clause and the lack of attention given to it during the founding era suggests that its terms must already have been in common usage. “Necessary and proper” feels like a lawyer's clause – a standard provision that, despite its importance, is not usually the subject of negotiation or debate. If the clause was indeed one commonly found in legal practice, it would be understandable why so few people found it worthy of analysis or attention at the time of its drafting.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Natelson, Robert, The Agency Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 Case Western Reserve Law Rev. 243 (2004)Google Scholar
Criddle, Evan J., Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 U.C.L.A. L. R. 117, 117 (2006)Google Scholar
Bilder, Mary Sarah, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 Yale L. J. 502 (2006)Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×