Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- 1 Understanding public attitudes towards the open economy
- 2 Change and discontent
- 3 Public support for economic openness
- 4 Public support for cultural protection
- 5 Protest and resistance
- 6 The role of the state
- 7 The legacy of regime change
- 8 The extent, nature, causes and consequences of public discontent
- References
- Index
4 - Public support for cultural protection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- 1 Understanding public attitudes towards the open economy
- 2 Change and discontent
- 3 Public support for economic openness
- 4 Public support for cultural protection
- 5 Protest and resistance
- 6 The role of the state
- 7 The legacy of regime change
- 8 The extent, nature, causes and consequences of public discontent
- References
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 1 we outlined some good reasons why the public might wish to change their traditional culture or preserve it; why they might welcome or resist cultural globalisation. Our aim in this chapter is to see how the public themselves define and value their culture. Do they fear that their culture, however defined, is threatened by opening up the economy? Insofar as opening up might erode their culture, are they willing to strike a Faustian bargain and trade culture and identity for material gain?
A Faustian bargain?
By instinct, the public were not very modest about their ‘culture’, whatever they meant by that. (We explore their meanings later.) Two-thirds agreed their ‘culture’ was ‘superior to others’ and wanted more emphasis on their own country's distinctive ‘culture and traditions’ (see Table 4.1).
At the same time, two-thirds felt that opening up the economy would inevitably bring cultural homogenisation and that their ‘traditional way of life’ was already ‘getting lost’. Significantly, it was in Ukraine and Vietnam, where the public felt their culture was strongest and homogenisation was less likely, that they were most keen to emphasise it more. Cross-nationally, public support for emphasising national culture therefore reflected cultural security rather than cultural fright. Nonetheless, even in Ukraine and Vietnam around 60 per cent felt opening up the economy would inevitably erode their cultural distinctiveness, and only around 24 per cent disagreed.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Open Economy and its EnemiesPublic Attitudes in East Asia and Eastern Europe, pp. 103 - 136Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006