The Tower Commission was appointed more than a decade after President Nixon had resigned from office. The individuals under its investigation and the nature of their operations had seemingly little in common with the Nixon-Kissinger system of foreign policy making. However, the observations and recommendations of the Tower Commission – appointed by President Reagan to investigate the rogue operations conducted by NSC staff during the Iran-Contra affair – transcend the immediate experience of the Reagan administration, or indeed any other specific case of presidential mismanagement of the NSC and the advisory system. The observations made here about the workings of the WSAG, and more broadly about the nature of the relationship among structures, processes, and personalities in U.S. foreign policy crisis decision-making, should serve as a reminder to future presidents that procedures are meant to serve purposes. They are not ends in themselves. An advisory group cannot determine the course of a crisis, nor can it shape its outcome. It requires presidential guidance and leadership, and when the leader is incapacitated due to emotional turbulence or physical exhaustion, it either fails to performs its tasks adequately or it must rely on an executive surrogate to fill in the vacuum of authority.