Book contents
- New Private Law Theory
- New Private Law Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- New Private Law Theory
- Part I Methods and Disciplines
- 1 The Inside and the Outside of Law?
- 2 Private Law and Sociology
- 3 Economics and Private Law Institutions
- 4 Private Law and Theories of Communication
- 5 Comparative Law and Legal History
- Part II Social Ordering, Constitutionalism and Private Law
- Part III Transactions and Risk: Private Law and the Market
- Part IV Persons and Organizations
- Part V Private Law (Rule-Setting) beyond the State
- Index
- References
3 - Economics and Private Law Institutions
from Part I - Methods and Disciplines
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 April 2021
Book contents
- New Private Law Theory
- New Private Law Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- New Private Law Theory
- Part I Methods and Disciplines
- 1 The Inside and the Outside of Law?
- 2 Private Law and Sociology
- 3 Economics and Private Law Institutions
- 4 Private Law and Theories of Communication
- 5 Comparative Law and Legal History
- Part II Social Ordering, Constitutionalism and Private Law
- Part III Transactions and Risk: Private Law and the Market
- Part IV Persons and Organizations
- Part V Private Law (Rule-Setting) beyond the State
- Index
- References
Summary
Is it possible to reduce the topic of ‘Economics and Private Law Institutions’ to three core ideas? This chapter cannot even summarize, let alone substitute for a treatise on law and economics or on new institutional economics (see fn. 16). Three developments – and their founding texts as well as their contexts – stand out, however, as the foundations of the relationship between economics and private law (theory).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- New Private Law TheoryA Pluralist Approach, pp. 71 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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