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20 - Actors in Organizations

from Part IV - Persons and Organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2021

Stefan Grundmann
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Hans-W. Micklitz
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Moritz Renner
Affiliation:
Universität Mannheim, Germany
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Summary

The chapter discusses the division of ownership and control, probably the most striking feature of large-scale economic organization in our time. This refers to the fact that the large company/corporation is owned by the totality of the shareholders, but the structure and assets ‘owned’ are managed and decided on primarily by the board of directors. Thus, ownership and decision power on the property are systematically in different hands – in law, but often also de facto. This fully applies at least to corporations with dispersed ownership, especially those listed on exchanges or alternative trading venues. Corporations of course do not only affect shareholders and managers, but at least two other groups. These are stakeholders in the more concrete sense, that is, parties that have a relatively concrete interest, typically supported by legal norms, namely contractual rights, in the corporation – labour and creditors.

Type
Chapter
Information
New Private Law Theory
A Pluralist Approach
, pp. 369 - 390
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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References

Berle, Adolf / Means, Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York / Chicago / Washington: Commerce Clearing House Publishing, 1932) ( book II, chapter 8, and book III, chapter 1)Google Scholar
Jensen, Michael / Meckling, William, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305–60 (1976)Google Scholar
Alchian, Armen / Demsetz, Harold, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 The American Economic Review 777–95 (1972)Google Scholar
Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, 57 The American Economic Review 347–59 (1967)Google Scholar
Fama, Eugene, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, 25 Journal of Finance 383417 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fama, Eugene, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 88 Journal of Political Economy 288307 (1980)Google Scholar
Walgenbach, Peter, ‘Neoinstitutionalistische Ansätze in der Organisationstheorie’, in A. Kieser / M. Ebers (eds.), Organisationstheorien (8th ed., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2019), pp.300–50Google Scholar

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