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Index

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Roger Schoenman
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Cruz

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Index

Adamczyk, Kazimierz 146–147
advanced industrial states 23
agency problems 57, 67, 69, 83
Albania
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
Allianz Capital 96–97
Allied Irish Bank 96–97
AOAR (Businessman’s Association of Romania) 80–81
assets
diversity 59, 67, 69–70, 72, 83
effects on state 86
specificity 58
AWS–UW government coalition (Poland) 96–98, 133–134, 152, 189
Bakurdzhiev, Evgeni 109–110
Bank Gdansky (Poland) 94
Bank Handlowy (Poland) 96, 118
Bank Staropolski (Poland) 135
Bank Zachodni (Poland) 96–97
banks
banking reform 179
banking regulation 31
Bulgaria 70, 102
Japan (keiretsu) 63
and ownership of firms 63, 90–91, 118
post-communist countries 70
Romania 70 See also individual banks
BANU (Bulgarian Agrarian National Union) 141
Basescu, Traian 192–193
BBB (Bulgarian Business Block) 141
BDK (Poland) 96–97
Becali, Gigi 101
Beckert, J. 37–38
BEEPS 7, 56, 72, 170
Berle, A. A. 57
Berlusconi, Silvio 193
BGZ Cooperative Bank (Poland) 96–97
BIBA (Bulgarian Investors Business Association) 81, 105
BIG (Poland) 94
Boc, Emil 192
book plan 24–25
Borisov, Boyko 142, 191–192
Bozhkov, Aleksandur 108
BPH (Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy) (Poland) 93–94
Brasco Inc. 146–147
broad business groups 64–65
broad distributive policies 132
broad networks See networks
broadly distributive institutions 3, 5–6, 10, 168
BSK (Bank Slaski) (Poland) 95
BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) 141–142, 145–146
“the generals” faction 141–142
budget constraints 13
Bulgargas 107, 109, 145–146
Bulgaria
administrative weakness 191–192
assassinations 8–9, 104–105
asset diversity 67, 70, 72
banks 70, 102
decentralization 102
ineffectiveness of 102
broadly distributive institutions 10
business associations 72–76, 81–83
business collective action 70–76
business domination, of political parties/state 30, 52, 102–110, 123–127
business groups
and insiders 104–105
semi-criminal 104–105, 191–192
business leaders’ influence 83
capital sources 173
as captured state 25, 84, 164, 173
collective action and self-interest 78
competition policy 9, 175–177
corruption 8, 52, 104–105, 142–143, 191–192
direct control struggles 107–110
elite career networks 188
elite mobility 152, 155–164
elite networks 145–147, 186–187
elite network ties 152
elites and elections 150, 153–157
embeddedness breadth 152
financial firms’ role 60, 70
firms against the state 141–143
firms and political parties 102
G-13 (“Group of Thirteen”) 82–83, 104–105
GDP in private sector 15–17
hierarchical ownership 127
horizontal ties 123–127
ideological turnover 174
and IMF 103, 142
imperial legacies 19–20
informal groups 82–83
law enforcement weakness 8–9, 191–192
lobbying 81–82
narrow networks 132, 141–143, 148–149, 152, 173, 191–192
national investment funds 105–107
network breadth, effects of 158–164
network ties 113–114
networks
limited access to 8–9
personnel 153–155
and uncertainty 173
organizations as irrelevant 69
owners by type 89
ownership concentration 59, 70, 72
ownership decentralization 91
ownership development 91, 102
ownership networks 102, 128, 188
ownership structures 123, 127
ownership types 186–187
path to privatization 102–110
political instability 45, 141–143, 191
political party finance 142–143, 188
post-transition 191–192
privatization 85, 102–110
opposition to 102–103
Privatization Act (1992) 102
privatization funds 106
RMDs (management–worker partnerships) 106–107, 145–146
and Russian financial crisis 105
shifting party system 141–143
socialist re-election 102–103
stakeholders 127
state ownership 91, 127
state/private mobility of individuals 152
tobacco industry 107–110
transaction law 9
uncertainty 174, 191–192
violent business methods 8–9, 104–105 See also institutions; See also networks
Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union 142
Bulgarian Industrial Association 81
Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association 81
Bulgarian miracle 108
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party 142
Bulgartabac 107–110, 123
bureaucratic institutions 23
bureaucrats’ careers and influence 25
business associations
Bulgaria 72–76, 81–83
Poland 72–79
Romania 72–76, 79–81
Business Centre Club 79
business collective action 70–76
business political action 67
businesspeople and politicians 43
BUSORG analysis variable 172–173
Buzek, Jerzy 2
Bykowski, Piotr 135
capital markets development 86–87
capitalism
financial 58
forms of 38–39, 58
industrial 58
institutional 58
managerial 58
VoC (varieties of capitalism) 22, 32, 33–36
captured states 25, 84, 164, 168, 173
competition policy 175–177
institutional development 183, 187
networks and uncertainty 173, 186
stability 189
uncertainty type 174 See also Bulgaria
career politicians, Poland 45–46
careers
bureaucrats’ careers and influence 25
elite bureaucrats and influence 25
elite career destinations 155, 158–164
elite networks 145–164
elites and elections 150, 153–157
overlapping career paths 56
strategic behaviour 151
Carruthers, B. G. 86–87
case study selection 22–23
CCIR (Romanian Chamber of Commerce) 81
CDR (Romanian Democratic Convention) 137, 139–140
Ceausescu, Nicolae 137
Chimco 145–146
CIGNA 97–98
Cigna STU 146–147
Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz 135
Ciorbea, Victor 100
civil society role, in democracy 48–49
cluster analysis, and state types 170–175
CMEs (coordinated market economies) 33–35, 193–194
collaborative relationships 34, 83
collective action
between firms and parties 131–144
and broad networks 187
and institutional factors 76–77
and privatization 77
COMPET analysis variable 172–173
competition
and corruption 46–47
and political influence 56–57
weak 189
competition law 31
competition levels 11
competition policy 175–177
competition problems 37–38
complementarities 32, 34
complex adaptive systems 41
concertation, as collective action 131–132
concertation states 25, 84, 164, 167–168
banking reform 179
cluster analysis 172–173
competition policy 175–177
institutional development 187
networks and uncertainty 173, 186
political party system changes 189–190
rule of law 183
stability 189
uncertainty type 174
western Europe 193–194 See also Poland
conditionality, and reform 11
Confederation of Bulgarian Industrialists 82–83, 104–105
Confindustria (Italy) 193
contractual governance 64
cooperation problems 37–38
coordination
between firms 55
non-market modes of 34
problems 37–38
corporate governance
of firms 24, 55, 57–58
Poland 7, 93
corruption 49–50, 169, 46–47
as inefficient 43–44
and investment 39
Poland 5–6, 190
Romania 138
credible commitments 56
cross-ownership 64
cultural legacies 17–21
customer-supplier relations 173
Czech Republic
effectiveness contrast with Albania 168
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
Czerwinski, Roman 146–147
DA (Justice and Truth Alliance) (Romania) 192
DC (Christian Democratic) party (Italy) 193
debt/equity swaps 92
decision making
and geography 17–21
and historical legacies 17–21
democracy, civil society role 48–49
Democratic Left alliance (Bulgaria) 142
democratic states, institutional development in 167–184
developmental states 23
literature 24, 32–33
dispute resolution 7
dynamic of insubordination 108
east Asian growth 185
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 1–19, 36, 94, 175, 177
Ecoglasnost Movement (Bulgaria) 142
economic governance, and embeddedness 37
economic policy, and incorporation of networks 30–31
economic and political elites 24, 55–56
economic reform See reform
economic/political stakeholders, interaction patterns 84–85
elections
and elite careers 150, 153–157
and political uncertainty 186
electoral volatility 48
elites
agencies’ role in network structure 11
balance of 87–88
and banks 63
bureaucrats’ careers and influence 25
career destinations 155, 158–164
career networks 145–164, 188
careers and elections 150, 153–157
competition 39
concentrated ownership 67–68
conflict between 37
cooperation between 86–87
coordination of 39–40
dispersed 68–69
elections and personnel movement 150
exchanges between 63
functioning of networks 145–147
incentives to act collectively 5, 30–31
individuals’ networks 148–152
mobility of 152, 155–157
political and economic 24, 55–56
in state building 38–39
state leaders’ motivations 35
and state reconception 151
state/private mobility of individuals 152 See also Bulgaria; See also Poland; See also Romania
embedded corporatist states 168
uncertainty type 174
embeddedness 32–33
breadth 152
and economic governance 37
multiple forms of 36–38
of owners 123–127
post-communist lack of 48
state 148
and state policy 151
emerging markets 38–39
employee buyouts 91
employer coordination 58
employer–worker relations 35, 58, 76–77
Energia Invest 145–146
“Enterprise and Bank Financial Restructuring Program” (Poland) 94
Estonia
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
European Union conditionality 21–22, 175
EuRoPolgaz 146–147
Evans, P. B. 31, 36–37, 148, 151
export sector size 58
external actors, influence of 21–22
factor analysis, and state types 170
Faniţa, Triţa 140
financial capitalism 58
financial firms’ role 60, 70
financial institutions 45
and secured transaction policy 179
financial transaction regulation 31
firm–firm networks 171
firms
agency problems 57, 67, 69
asset diversity 67, 69
authority structures 58
behavior of 24
business collective action 70–76
in central and eastern Europe 69–76
coalition of 35
collaboration 83
collective action 67–69
and institutional factors 76–77
competition policy 175–177
coordination 55
coordinated political action 67
corporate governance 24, 55, 57–58
credible commitments 56
director networks 24
German 193–194
hierarchically integrated 64–65
influence on political actors 56–57, 131–144
involvement with state 56–57
and legal system 59
networks 118, 123–127
network structure types 186–187
ownership See ownership
and parties 56–57, 131–144
and party finance 131–144
and party network density 131–132
and political relations 42–43, 131–144
in post-communist Europe 69–76
sanitizing 93
and the state See institutional development
state capture 56–57
top connected 115 See also Bulgaria; See also Poland; See also Romania
G-13 (“Group of Thirteen”) 82–83, 104–105
Ganchev, Georges 141
Gazprom
and Gudzowaty 1–3
and Poland 1–3, 146–147
GDP in private sector 15–17
geographic proximity to West 20
GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) 142, 191–192
Germany, as concertation state 193–194
government turnover, and rule of law 46–47
“grabbing hand” approach 14
gradualism 11–17
Granovetter, M. S. 40–41
Grzymała-Busse, A. 46–47
Gudzowaty, Aleksander 1–3, 97–98, 135, 146–147
guilds tradition 58
Gwiazda, A. 190
Hall, P. A. 35
Hellman, J. S. 31–32
hierarchical cluster analysis 171
historical legacies, and reform 11, 17–22
Humanist Party (Romania) 9, 101, 139
Hungary
ideological turnover 174
legacies 20
networks and uncertainty 173
rule of law 183
uncertainty type 174
ideological turnover 46–47, 172, 174
IDTURN analysis variable 172–173
Iliescu, Ion 100
Iliescu, Valentin 140
Iliev, Vasil 104
imperial legacy inconsistencies 19–20
industrial capitalism 58
inflation 12
informal coalitions 21–22
information sharing 37
ING (Poland) 95, 114–116
insider interests 13
insider networks 35
institution building 44, 84–85
historical forces and social structures 194–195
institutional bargains 64
institutional capitalism 58
institutional choice 42–43
institutional design 42–43
institutional development 10–11
captured states 183
competition policy 175–177
EBRD 1–19, 36, 94, 175
effects on governance 174–183
effects of networks 40–44
effects of ownership structures 57
in new democracies 167–184
and uncertainty 38–40, 52
institutional factors, and collective action 76–77
institutional investors 60–62, 65
institutions
broadly distributive 3, 5–6, 10, 168
complementarities 32, 34
definition 3
and economic reform 33
employer–worker relations 35, 58, 76–77
financial institutions 45
formal 3
and geography 17–21
hardened 189
and historical legacies 17–22
incomplete 5
market institutions and political struggle 87–88
and networks 3, 5–6, 17, 43–44
redistributive consequences 3
selective advantage 3
and VoC (varieties of capitalism) research 32 See also Bulgaria; See also networks; See also Poland; See also Romania
interaction patterns 84–85
interest groups, and external pressures 22
investment distortions 12
investors 60–62
Italy, as patronage state 193
Jacoby, W. 21–22
k-means cluster analysis 171
Kaczynski brothers 134
Kamela-Sowińska, Aldona 133–134
Kang, D. C. 37
key findings 186–189
Kitschelt, H. 21
Kostov, Georgi 109
Kostov, Ivan 102–103, 106–109, 142
Kostova, Elena 106–107
Krackhardt, D. 42
Kremikovtsi 145–146
Kulczyk, Jan 3, 97–98, 135–136
Kwasniewski, Aleksander 94, 136, 146–147
Kyulev, Emil 104–105
labor contracts 35, 58
labor mobility 35
labor reallocation/layoffs 12
Latvia
ideological turnover 174
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
law
rule of 31, 183
and concertation states 183
and government turnover 46–47
Law on Campaign Finance (1997) (Poland) 134
leadership coalitions 47
legal regime uncertainty 15
legal systems, inherited 23
Lewandowski, Janusz 136
Lipton, D. 12–13
literatures
networks/uncertainty 32–33
in political economy 24, 31
Lithuania
ideological turnover 174
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
LMEs (liberal market economies) 33–35
lobbying 58, 72–76, 78, 81–82, 172
Lukanov, Andre 141
managerial capitalism 58
market institutions and political struggle 87–88
markets and networks 170
Matei Agathon, Dan 138
Means, G. C. 57
Meciar, Valdimir 20
Michailov, Dako 107
Minchev, Ognyan 103
Moore, B. 86
MRF (Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms) 141–142
Multigroup 8, 105, 108, 123, 145–146
Musetescu, Ovidiu 101
mutual hostages 37
mutual interests 51
mutual monitoring 37
narrow networks See networks
National Gas Company (Bulgaria) 145–146
NEC (National Electric Company) (Bulgaria) 109–110
NETFIN analysis variable 171, 173
network advantages 30–31
network analysis 41–42, 195
network breadth, effects of 158–164
network capital sources 172
network coalitions 22, 39, 47
network reconfigurations 87
network reputational monitoring 194
network-sourced capital 41
networks
acquaintance relationships 41
actors 148–149
and broadly distributive institutions 6, 10
businesspeople and politicians 43
and corruption/violence 5, 8–9
and diversity 41–42
effect on institutional development 40–44
elite career networks 145–164
elite individuals 148–152
and external stimuli 87
firm–firm 171
firm–party 13, 131–144
and firms’ behavior 24
and firms’ ownership/director networks 24
functioning of elite networks 48–49
and individials’ ability 42
of individuals 43, 133–134
information sharing 37
and institutions 3, 5–6, 17, 32, 34, 43–44 See also institutions
inter-firm 32–34
joint memberships 56
and key job movement 149–150
long-term 6–7
and markets 170
mutual monitoring 37
as obstacles to institutions 29
and opportunity 50
overlapping career paths 56
ownership 44, 56
party–society linkage 47–48
personal ties 133–134
personnel network development 153–155
and political competition 24, 40
public administration 148–149
reasons for emergence 5
reasons for variations in 5
relationships with institutions 3, 5–6
as resources 11
social network analysis 194–195
and social structures 43
state–economy ties 36–37
strong ties 40
structure and agency 42, 152–153
tight 40
types of 6
and uncertainty 5–6, 10, 22, 24–25, 30–33, 50–51, 173, 186
and violence 8–9
VoC (varieties of capitalism) research literature 32–33
weak ties theory 40–41 See also Bulgaria; See also embeddedness; See also firms; See also Poland; See also Romania
New Generation Party (Romania) 101
NFIs (national investment funds) (Poland) 94
Niculae, Ioan 101
nonmarket modes of coordination 34
North, D. 194–195
NSF (National Salvation Front) (Romania) 9, 138, 140
Oleksy, Josef 2–3
Orion group 105
outsider stakeholders 13
ownership
banks 63, 90–91, 118
broad business groups 64–65
business/industrial pyramids 60–62, 65–67
cross-holdings 6
cross-ownership 64–65
decreasing concentration 69
director networks 24
dispersed 68–69
diversified 65
and economic development 86–88
elite 67–68
external stakeholders 58–59
family group 60–62, 65–68
firms’ ownership data 88–90, 115
hierarchical structure 60, 65–67
horizontal structure 60, 62–65, 67, 92
hybrid 85
institutional investors 60–62, 65
investors 60, 65
owners by type 89
and privatization 84
shareholders 57–59 See also Bulgaria; See also firms; See also Poland; See also Romania
ownership concentration 59, 67–68, 70, 72
ownership development 88–92
ownership networks 44, 56, 128
broad 59
findings summary 188
narrow 59, 98
and politics–business relations 86–88
ownership reconfigurations 87
ownership structure 24, 44–45, 56–62
and configuration of interests 87–88
hierarchical structure 60
horizontal structure 60, 62–65
ownership ties 55
ownership types 186–187
Palikot’s Movement (Poland) 190
parties See political parties
Patriciu, Dinu 139
patronage states 25, 84, 164, 168
cluster analysis 173
competition policy 175–177, 183–184
institutional development 183–184, 187
Italy as western European example 193
networks and uncertainty 173, 186
political elites 183–184
rule of law 183–184
stability 189
uncertainty type 174 See also Romania
Paunescu, Adrian 140
Paunescu family (Romania) 80, 100–102
Pavlov, Ilya 7–9, 104–105
Pawlak, Waldemar 146–147, 150
PBG (Poland) 96–97
PBK (Poland) 96
PBKS (Poland) 96–97
PC (Centrum Alliance) (Poland) 134
PC (Conservative Party) (Romania) 192
PD (Democratic Party) (Romania) 100, 138, 192
PD-L (Democratic Liberal Party) (Romania) 138, 192
PDSR (Party of Social Democracy of Romania) 9
PEKAO (Poland) 96–97
personal ties 133–134
personnel network development 153–155
PiS (Law and Justice Party) (Poland) 97–98, 190–191
PKN Orlen 146–147
PKO BP 96–97
planning structure collapse 13
PNL (National Liberal Party) (Romania) 138, 192
PO (Civic Action) (Poland) 190
PO–PSL coalition (Poland) 190
Poland
asset diversity 67, 70, 72
banks 70, 85, 90–98
centrality 118
foreign 114–116
inefficiency 168–169
key role of 186–187
privatization 93–97
restructuring 93, 95
as shareholders 97, 118
broad networks 92–98, 127, 131–132, 152
broad organizations 78
broadly devised institutions 7
broadly distributive institutions 3, 5
business associations 72–79
business collective action 70–76
business groups 97–98
business and political left 135
business and political right 135–136
business–party alliances 132–137
business–politics connections 97–98, 100–102
and capitalist competition 190–191
career politicians 45–46
Civil Service Law 190
collective action organizations 69
common owners 78
communist influence, post-transition 133
as concertation state 25, 84, 131–132, 164
corporate governance
law 7
structure 93
corruption 5–6, 190
cross-ownership networks 92
debt/equity swaps 92
decentralized structures 94
dispute resolution 41
economic reform 4
effectiveness contrast with Albania 168–169
elite career networks 188
elite mobility 152, 155–164
elite network ties 152
elite networks 146–147, 186–187
elites and elections 150, 153–157
embeddedness breadth 152
financial firms’ role 60, 70
financial institutions 118
financial law 7
firm networks 118
firms’ collaboration 83
firms’ management and active role of state 190–191
foreign banks 114–116
foreign investment/ownership 90–91, 93–95, 114–116
gas supply and Gazprom 1–3
gas supply and Gudzwaty 1–3
GDP in private sector 15–17
hybrid institutions 127, 190–191
ideological turnover 174
imperial legacies 19–20
industrial policy 133–134
leadership coalitions 47
lobbying 7
long-term networks 6–7
mutual interests 51
narrow networks 148–149
national investment funds 106
network breadth, effects of 158–164
network emergence 29–30
network formation 3–5
network ownership 29–30, 110–116
network-sourced capital 7
network ties 113–114, 169–170
networks 110–118
elite networks 146–147
and uncertainty 173
owners by type 89
ownership concentration 59, 70, 72
ownership development 90–91
ownership networks 6, 128, 188
ownership ties 113–114
ownership transformation 110–116
ownership types 186–187
party finance “arms race” 133–134
party patronage 190
party system volatility 190
party–business alliances 132–137
party–society connections 48–49
path to privatization 92–98
personnel networks 6, 29–30, 153–155
political competition 4–5
political parties and elections 45–46
political party finance 188
and business 4, 29–30, 132–137, 143–144
political party system changes 189–190
politicized appointments 6
post-transition institutions 189–191
privatization 4, 12–13, 85, 136–137
and political manipulation 92–93
process/methods 92–93
redistributive consequences 3
rule of law 183
selective advantage institutions 3
state authority 7
state ownership 118
state–economy connections 190
state firm ownership 118
state/private mobility of individuals 152
transition to capitalism 3–5, 189–191
uncertainty type 174
variable institutional performance 168–169 See also institutions; See also networks
Polanyi, K. 37–38
PolGaz Telekom 146–147
policy-making areas 31
Polish Business Roundtable (PRB) 78
Polish Confederation of Employers (KPP) 78
Polish Confederation of Private Employers Leviathan (PKPP) 78
political capitalism 2–3
political coalitions 22, 39, 47
political competition 11
and networks 24
political and economic elites 24
political economy, literatures in 24
political interference 13–15
political legacies 17–21
political parties
alliances 48
connections to state 48–49
finance 131–144, 188
finance “arms race” 133–134
and firms See firms
public funding 49
public regulation of 49
rent seeking 49–50
as representative actors 47–48
society connections 47–49
system changes 189–190 See also Bulgaria; See also Poland; See also Romania
political resources, and lobbying 58
political uncertainty See uncertainty
political/economic stakeholders, interaction patterns 84–85
politicization
of key jobs 149–150
of property 147
of the state 50
Popescu-Tariceanu, Calin 192
post-communist states, as case studies 23
post-post-socialism 84
price liberalization 12
private economy size 15–17
privatization 4, 12–13
and bureaucracy 15
and collective action 77
and ownership 84
and stakeholders 84
and uncertainty 90 See also Bulgaria; See also Poland; See also Romania
productivity 12
Pruteanu, George 140
PSD (Social Democrat Party) (Romania) 9, 30, 80–81, 99–102, 137–138, 140, 192–193
PSL (Polish Peasant Party) 190
Purvanov, Georgi 141–142
“red bourgeoisie” 105
reform
compensation costs 14
and conditionality 11
during transition 31–32
EBDR reform index 1–19
gradualism approach 11–17, 22
and historical legacies 11, 17–22
influence of state actors 13
and new institutions 33
partial reform 13
political sustainability of 10
shock therapy approach 11–17, 22, 31–32
relational contracting 34
rent seeking 49–50, 55–56
retail shortages 12
RMDs (management–worker partnerships) 106–107, 145–146
Roman, Petre 99–100
Romania
asset diversity 67, 70, 72
asset redistribution 98–102
banks 70
bureaucracy and business 51–52
business associations 72–76, 79–81
business collective action 70–76
business elites 138
business fragmentation 9, 51–52
business groups 100–102
business leaders’ influence 83
business, and political parties 30, 51–52, 139
corruption 138
dominant party election 132
elite career networks 188
elite mobility 152, 155–164
elite network ties 152
elite networks 147, 186–187
elites and elections 150, 153–157
embeddedness breadth 152
employee buyouts 91
EU trade 99
exports 99
financial firms’ role 60, 70
firm networks 118
firms against the state 137–140
firms and political parties 102
foreign investment/ownership 91
GDP in private sector 15–17
and IMF 100
imperial legacies 19–20
imports 99
inflation 99
MPPs (mass privatization programs) 98–100
narrow networks 132, 148–149, 152
national investment funds 106
network breadth, effects of 158–164
networks and uncertainty 173
organizations, as personal political 69, 78
owners by type 89
ownership concentration 59, 70, 72
ownership development 91
ownership, hierarchical 127
ownership networks 91, 98, 118, 128, 188
ownership types 186–187
path to privatization 98–102
as patronage state 25, 84, 164
personnel network development 153–155
political defection/migration 140
political elites 46, 137, 193
political instability 192–193
political leadership inertia 192–193
political party finance 9, 137–140, 143–144, 188
political party finance White Paper 139–140
political party financial statements 137
political party inertia 46
private ownership funds 98–99
privatization 85, 98–102, 118
government attitude to 101–102
RAs (regies autonomes) 99
SOEs (state-owned enterprises) 99
state ownership 118
state ownership funds 98–99
state privatization funds 85
state/private mobility of individuals 152
transition period 9
uncertainty type 174 See also institutions; See also networks
Rothschild, Baron de 42, 152–153
Sachs, J. 12–13
search theory 40–41
secured transaction policy 179
selective advantage institutions 3, 36
Severin, Adrian 140
shareholders See firms
Shervashidze, Nikita 145–146
Shilyashki, Ivan 109–110
shock program 12
shock therapy 11–17, 22, 31–32
Simeon II, Tsar (Bulgaria) 103
SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) (Poland) 1–2, 29–30, 97–98, 133–134, 136, 151, 189
Slovak Republic
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
Slovenia
networks and uncertainty 173
uncertainty type 174
Smietanko, Andrzej 146–147
SNM (National Movement Simeon II) (Bulgaria) 103, 142
social network analysis 194–195
Sofianski, Stefan 142
Solidarity (Poland) 2, 29–30, 96–97
Solorz-Zak, Zygmunt 97–98
Soskice, D. W. 35
stakeholder groups 87
stakeholder interaction patterns 84–85
stakeholder lobby 12–13, 15
Stamboliyski, Aleksandar 142
state borrowing 86–87
state capture 56–57
state embeddedness 148
state leaders, motivations 35
state reconception, and elites 151
state structures, and market construction 150
state type analysis
data and methods 170–171
variables 170–171
state–business relations 83
state–economy ties 36–37
Stoichev, Krassimir 104–105
Stoilov, Georgi 109–110
Stolojan, Theodor 99, 192
SUPP analysis variable 171, 173
“tabula rasa” approach 48
Tangentopoli scandal (Italy) 193
tax authority inspections 172
TAXINS analysis variable 172–173
Telegraf 134
Tomov, Alexander 108
Tourist Sports Bank (Bulgaria) 104–105
TPSA 3
transnational capital flow 23
TRON group 104–105
Tsvetanov, Tsvetan 191
UDF (Union of Democratic Forces) (Bulgaria) 91, 102–103, 106–109, 141, 145–146, 152
UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) 192
UGIR (General Union of Romanian Industrialists) 80–81
UGIR-1903 (General Union of Romanian Industrialists 1903) 80–81
uncertainty
and broad networks 187
and business–party alliances 133
and cooperation 131–144
correct balance of 39–40
and elections 186
and elite career networks 145–164
and future 45–47
and institutional development 38–40
political 11, 45–46 See also ideological turnover
and political changes 46–47
and political competition 45–46
and privatization 90
types 174
Ungureanu, Mihai Razvan 192
Unicredito Italiano 96–97
USD (Union of Social Democrats) (Romania) 100
USL (Social-Liberal Union) (Romania) 192
UtdDF (United Democratic Forces) (Bulgaria) 142
valley of transition 31–32
Vasile, Radu 100
Videnov, Zhan 103, 105–106, 109–110
VoC (varieties of capitalism) 33–36
Voiculescu, Dan 9, 81, 101, 139
voter volatility 48
voter–party attachment 47–48
Wałęsa, Lech 3
Washington Consensus 169
WBK (Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy) (Poland) 94
weak ties theory 40–41
workout agreements 92
Zhelev, Zhelyu 141

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  • Index
  • Roger Schoenman, University of California, Santa Cruz
  • Book: Networks and Institutions in Europe's Emerging Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
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  • Index
  • Roger Schoenman, University of California, Santa Cruz
  • Book: Networks and Institutions in Europe's Emerging Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
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  • Index
  • Roger Schoenman, University of California, Santa Cruz
  • Book: Networks and Institutions in Europe's Emerging Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2014
Available formats
×