Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of acronyms
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Power, interests, and negotiations
- 3 Services and intellectual property: multilateral framework negotiations
- 4 Cultural industries and telecommunications: multilateral sectoral negotiations
- 5 Infrastructure pricing negotiations: evaluating alternatives when facing a significant market power
- 6 Electronic commerce: reaching agreement when facing market power in Internet governance and data privacy
- 7 Conclusion: power and governance
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Infrastructure pricing negotiations: evaluating alternatives when facing a significant market power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 June 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of acronyms
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Power, interests, and negotiations
- 3 Services and intellectual property: multilateral framework negotiations
- 4 Cultural industries and telecommunications: multilateral sectoral negotiations
- 5 Infrastructure pricing negotiations: evaluating alternatives when facing a significant market power
- 6 Electronic commerce: reaching agreement when facing market power in Internet governance and data privacy
- 7 Conclusion: power and governance
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
A price that blocks exchange among willing exchangers is clearly not an efficiency price, but which of the various prices that do not block it is the efficiency price? An answer sufficient for all purposes at this point is that the efficiency price is the price that would be established if the sellers and buyers became so numerous that no single buyer or seller could manipulate the price.
Charles E. Lindblom Politics and MarketsIn an increasingly interconnected global economy, the assumption is too often made that countries will abide by written and unwritten rules backed by a majority of global actors. When we come across cases that go against these established rules, then consideration needs to be given to how the country or coalition was able to pull off such a feat. This chapter discusses two cases where the US did not change its position against pressures from the rest of the world; in both cases the concentration of power, namely market power, advantaged the US in the negotiations.
The international telecommunications pricing regime changed very little since multilateral coordination began in the mid nineteenth century until the 1990s (see Chapter 4). The cartel of monopoly carriers and PTTs worked hard to maintain high profits from international calls. Change was only supposed to occur when there was a general consensus in the cartel.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Negotiation and the Global Information Economy , pp. 179 - 228Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008