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3 - Obstacles, Success, and Risks: The German Navy, 1905–1907

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2024

Matthew S. Seligmann
Affiliation:
Brunel University London
Matthew Epkenhans
Affiliation:
Universität Potsdam, Germany
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Summary

The following 17 documents cover the period from 1905 to 1907 which witnessed some fundamental changes in the schedule of the German naval build-up. In the end, the construction rate was quite surprisingly accelerated to a temporary four-ship tempo [62]. To some extent, the document drafted by Tirpitz in November 1905 can claim a central position in this development. In this he presented a comprehensive survey of his naval policy which was to inform the Chancellor [49], and to reaffirm the guiding principles of his naval programme. The paramount objective was to secure a guaranteed construction rate of three large ships per annum for an indefinite period of time. The primary method was to curtail the budgetary control which the Reichstag could exert over the Navy Estimates by providing for a proper law. The chief purpose of the fleet was to eliminate ‘the English threat’. To this end, Tirpitz aimed to establish a ‘Risk Fleet’, this time labelled a ‘defensive fleet’, at least for the time being. The next step would be to introduce the draft of an Amendment (Novelle) to renew the request of six large cruisers originally tabled in 1900, but at that time denied by the Reichstag [50]. As long as the basic concept of the build-up, which centred on a battle fleet whose structure and types were defined in the Navy Law, served its purpose, the gradual achievement of the envisaged steady building rate would be the right way to go. Even though this confirmation of the essentials did not provide much surprising information, the vigorous defence mounted by Tirpitz and some additional hints suggested that the foundations on which Tirpitz's design rested were already giving way.

The critical state of the imperial finances probably caused the gravest concern to the Imperial Navy Office. The debt of the German Empire had already reached staggering levels. In 1890, it amounted to 1,117.9 million marks. By 1895 it had risen to 2,081.2 million marks and by 1900 to 2,298.5 million marks. At the time of Tirpitz's 1905 memorandum, it was estimated at 3,203.5 million marks only to reach 4,844.1 million marks by 1910. In spite of several initiatives to get this debt under control, a thorough reform of the German tax regime failed to gain approval due to the irreconcilable interests of the parties from which the Imperial Government tried to draw support.

Type
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The Naval Route to the Abyss
The Anglo German Naval Race 1895-1914
, pp. 155 - 236
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2015

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