Introduction

If we want to understand the peculiar problems consciousness poses for attempts to slot it into the natural order, then we have to understand what is peculiar to, or about, consciousness. In the remainder of the book, I want to press a certain claim, one that, I shall argue, has enormous ramifications. What is peculiar to consciousness is its structure, in particular, its dual structure. Consciousness can be both object and act of experience. Metaphorically speaking, consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Consciousness can include both experiential features of which we are aware, and experiential features with which we are aware. This bifurcation lies at the core of consciousness; consciousness is essentially hybrid, and this, I shall argue, is the basis of its peculiarity.

The hybrid character of consciousness brings with it the possibility of ambiguity in our interpretation of its central features. For example, as we saw in part 1, a conceptual device that has assumed particular importance in explaining the character of consciousness is the notion that there is something that it is like to be conscious, or to undergo conscious experience. However, if consciousness is, indeed, essentially hybrid in character, then this introduces the possibility of quite distinct interpretations of the what it is like of conscious experience.