This chapter is concerned with just conduct in securitization. Three criteria are relevant here. The first is concerned with the appropriateness and proportionality of the security measures to the threat in question. Specifically I hold that securitization is morally permissible only in the presence of the just cause, this means that securitizations that utilize security measures that exceed the threat and/or target another issue are not justified. The second principle is concerned with reducing harm. I argue that security measures must aim to cause, or risk the least amount of overall harm possible and do less harm to those it seeks to protect than there would be if securitization was abandoned. A final criterion is concerned with restraining the conduct of executors of securitization. In this context I explain why just securitization cannot be conducted with total disregard for a number of core human rights, including the right to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary detention. The remainder of the chapter briefly considers if there are moral exemptions to the rules of just conduct. It goes on to consider whether executors of securitization are morally culpable for partaking in securitizations that are unjust for just initiation reasons. Finally the chapter discusses the possibility of simultaneous just securitization and counter-securitization.