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4 - Discounting the Future and the Morality in Climate Change Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Darrel Moellendorf
Affiliation:
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
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Summary

“[A]nd Esau came from the field, and he was faint: And Esau said to Jacob, Feed me, I pray thee, with that same red pottage; for I am faint…And Jacob said, Sell me this day thy birthright. And Esau said, Behold, I am at the point to die: and what profit shall this birthright do to me? And Jacob said, Swear to me this day; and he sware unto him: and he sold his birthright unto Jacob. Then Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentiles; and he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way: thus Esau despised his birthright.”

Genesis 25: 29–34

Some readers of Genesis believe that in this passage, Jacob exploited the desperately hungry Esau. Others believe that Esau simply acted in a profoundly imprudent manner. The author of the passage seems to be in the latter camp because he judges Essau to have despised his birthright. If that is the case, this ancient story is but a vivid example of a familiar foible. There is considerable evidence that people generally prefer present benefits over greater future benefits. Economists have a word for this; they call it “imprudence.” That seems fair enough. Some economists have the view that such a preference should be reflected in the value attached to the future costs and benefits of public policy. But when those costs and benefits are enjoyed by other people, the preference for present goods is not imprudence, but a kind of partiality not obviously different from other kinds of pernicious favoritism, such as using public policy to benefit people to whom one feels especially close.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change
Values, Poverty, and Policy
, pp. 90 - 122
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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