The central conclusion from the analysis in this book is perhaps normatively troubling. Military threats can be useful in several ways. First, they can enable actors to establish commitments necessary to obtain better deals. Second, they can communicate these commitments credibly so that the opponent can believe them. Third, they can undermine the opponent's commitment and make it more likely that he will concede, which in turn can reduce the risk of war.

One may be tempted to think that military coercion is a cheap alternative to war preparation. As such one may wonder whether an opponent could be coerced by sending a battalion of Marines or perhaps one task group. The analysis in this book suggests that this is unlikely to work if the force being sent is significantly smaller than what one would need for actual operations. In fact, the model suggests that it may have to be quite a bit larger.

The reason for this has nothing to do with credibility – as we have seen, preparation for war is just as believable as an optimal military threat.