SUBJECTIVISM

I understand subjectivism as a specific form of what may be called “the internal reasons model of practical reason.” The internal and external reasons models amount to two different interpretations of statements of the form “Agent A has a reason to Φ” and “There is a reason for A to Φ.” Is the statement “Agent A has a reason to Φ” falsified by the lack of something in A's “subjective motivational set” which would support the performance of the action in question by A? A positive answer to this question amounts to the internal reasons model – the view that all practical reasons are internal reasons – and a negative answer amounts to the external reasons model – the view that there are external reasons.

The distinction between the internal and the external reasons model is drawn in terms of the notion of the agent's subjective motivational set. What, though, is in the agent's subjective motivational set? One might suppose that it is composed of the agent's current desires. This is not how Bernard Williams understands it. According to Williams, the content of the set is not exhausted by the agent's desires. Rather, the subjective motivational set “can contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.”

In addition, Williams assumes that the contents of the subjective motivational set are not statically given, but are affected by the agent's deliberations.