Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Logical dynamics, agency, and intelligent interaction
- 2 Epistemic logic and semantic information
- 3 Dynamic logic of public observation
- 4 Multi-agent dynamic-epistemic logic
- 5 Dynamics of inference and awareness
- 6 Questions and issue management
- 7 Soft information, correction, and belief change
- 8 An encounter with probability
- 9 Preference statics and dynamics
- 10 Decisions, actions, and games
- 11 Processes over time
- 12 Epistemic group structure and collective agency
- 13 Logical dynamics in philosophy
- 14 Computation as conversation
- 15 Rational dynamics in game theory
- 16 Meeting cognitive realities
- 17 Conclusion
- References
- Index
15 - Rational dynamics in game theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Logical dynamics, agency, and intelligent interaction
- 2 Epistemic logic and semantic information
- 3 Dynamic logic of public observation
- 4 Multi-agent dynamic-epistemic logic
- 5 Dynamics of inference and awareness
- 6 Questions and issue management
- 7 Soft information, correction, and belief change
- 8 An encounter with probability
- 9 Preference statics and dynamics
- 10 Decisions, actions, and games
- 11 Processes over time
- 12 Epistemic group structure and collective agency
- 13 Logical dynamics in philosophy
- 14 Computation as conversation
- 15 Rational dynamics in game theory
- 16 Meeting cognitive realities
- 17 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
Games are an arena where all strands of rational agency and interaction come together. In Chapter 10, we showed how extensive games fit well with dynamic logics of knowledge, belief, and preference, adding an account of mid- and long-term agency. In principle, this has made all points about games that are relevant to the main line of this book. For readers who have not had enough of games yet, in this chapter we show how logical dynamics interfaces with game theory, in particular, solution procedures for games in strategic form. Our main tool is iterated public announcement, and our style will be more impressionist.
Reaching equilibrium as an epistemic process
Iterative solution Solving games often involves an algorithm finding optimal strategies, like Backward Induction for extensive games.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction , pp. 313 - 329Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011