Since independence in 1948, Myanmar (then Burma) has grappled with the idea and implementation of federalism. It remains the major demand of the non-dominant ethnic nationalities but has been resisted by many of the majority Bamar community (especially the military and other political elites) despite promises to the contrary. The 1947 Panglong Agreement, which was a precursor to independence, enshrined the idea of “ethnofederalism”. That is, provinces (states, regions, divisions) that recognise and institutionalise the rights of ethnic nationalities to their traditional homelands and resources, to use their own languages in official business and education, and to self-determination.

But much has changed since 1947. For one, various governments have pursued a Bamar-based nation-building agenda, which included official status for the Burmese (and not minority) language and special status for the Buddhist religion. There has been significant migration and intermingling of different ethnic communities in many parts of the country. Democracy is (arguably) in its third incarnation, with the National League for Democracy (NLD) winning the 2015 election and establishing a constitutional reform process, under the guise of the 21st Century Panglong Conference, with the objective of establishing a “genuine federal union”. However, its progress has stalled, in large part because of (the military’s) concerns relating to secession.

The secession risk associated with federalism is a longstanding issue. Paradoxically, federalism indeed can help to prevent secession, while at the same time making it more likely. This is particularly the case with ethnofederalism, the approach favoured by Myanmar's ethnic leaders. The paradox plays into a more general debate about the relative merits of ethnofederalism, where state/provinces are based on ethnicity and language, and territorial federalism (also known as regional federalism), where states/provinces are based on economy, resources, infrastructure, geography, etc.

We implemented a series of experimental deliberative surveys to engage with these debates on the ground, to contribute to feeding a deliberative perspective into the current constitutional reform process, and to refine deliberative democratic methodologies for use in deeply divided societies and constitutional reform processes in Asia. This paper is based on the results of those deliberative surveys.