Thus far I have been concerned with laying the foundations for a biocentrically focused and biologically informed approach to bioethics. Actual bioethical issues have been touched on only briefly and in passing. Now I address certain central issues in bioethics more directly, doing so on the basis of the understanding of life and interests that we have been developing. I start with that which is most vital to bioethics, life itself. First, let us ask what the value, is for us, of our life or death. Though I have previously provided a characterization of life, I have not yet provided one of death. For the time being, however, let us assume that death is what happens when life stops. In a later chapter, after I have developed more material, I shall offer a more thorough account of death and of where life gives way to death, if such a point can be identified. We will also need to ask what dies. Now, though, our question is this: What might be the value of life or death? I ask this question in continuation of the preceding discussion of the nature of life.

I agree with virtually everyone that death is normally contrary to the interests of people and other living beings. Perhaps more surprising, I argue that death in some instances can be in a person's best interests. However, I first argue that death is normally not in one's best interests. This may seem so self-evident as not to require argument. It takes no ghost from beyond the grave to tell us that. Still, if we look for reasons why this should be so, we may find it surprisingly difficult to find them. Is our usual aversion to death perhaps an expression of instinct rather than a conclusion of fact or of reason? Is it a mere arational prejudice? My concern here is to argue that this conclusion really is true and, more important, in so doing, to indicate why it is true. The why of it has important implications concerning not only the disvalue of death but also the value of one's life, and the moral conclusions we ought to draw therefrom.