A distinctive conception of legality is in charge of our legal practice. This conception is the idea of law-like law. It emphasizes the importance of the nomological ‒ law-like ‒ qualities of laws. It says that law should take the form of general, impersonal, coherent prescription that operates to sustain rational resolution. The idea of law-like law is a liberal conception of what law ought to be, because it calls for the kind of law needed in order to secure equal liberty in society. The condition of legality which is sought by judges in the doing of our law is frequently called "the rule of law." But this term, much used in discussion of law in the United States and in kindred legal systems, has been invested with many meanings, some fundamental, most not. The fundamental aspiration of our law, according to the nomenclature of this book, is to bring about the condition here called "liberal" ‒ or "nomological" ‒ legality. When liberal legality exists, law's governance of life is secured. Judgments of the courts uphold people's legal entitlements and confer evenhanded legal justice.