The second premise of disorder accepted in the doing of liberal law is the premise of unsure concepts. This premise is an assumption about the condition of language in general communication outside law. According to the premise of unsure concepts, vagueness is a pervasive feature of common language outside law. Concepts and meanings of common language are open-ended, uncertain in reach. Vague categories are unsure in their grasp of the world. Their fields of operation are not marked by definite bounds. Uncertainty in aplication bespeaks openness of meaning. Alternative renderings of a vague item are equally available. Affliction with pervasive vagueness is a bad condition for liberal law. If classifications and distinctions used in law are no sharper than those of common language, then formal law will be irremediably indecisive. If law's rules are subject to the same infirmity that affects language outside law, then formal law will be similarly unsure in application to the world. Ordinary vagueness disables subsumption of particulars. It would bring formally rational classification of particulars to a point of impasse. When unable to categorize the uncategorized, formal legal argument will fail to secure nomological legality.