GREENE, THE LEFT AND THE EXECUTIVE

The year's postponement was wholly to the advantage of the advocates of reform. A snap vote on Friday morning could only have supported the NEC. Dalton's commitment gave the local parties' movement a year in which, first, to convince the NEC that its case was substantial and that constituency feeling was not ephemeral, and second, to gain enough trade union support to carry a change. Greene had no illusions about the difficulty of the task. He did not see any chance of achieving it ‘unless great pressure can be put upon the Executive’.

Greene had to be careful. He needed to rally support wherever he could find it. Yet those most willing to give active help were people already hostile to the Party leadership for other reasons. The Unity Campaign opened in January 1937 with a great burst of publicity centering around the position of Cripps. There was a serious danger that the Executive's attitude would be hardened by an association between the local parties and the Left. And there was also a danger that many constituency parties would be persuaded that the regional associations pioneered by Greene were front organisations for attempts to disrupt the Party.

Above all, the attitude of the trade unions was crucial. Greene had no dealings with the trade unions. His movement was, indeed, aimed at breaking what he considered to be the stranglehold of the unions at Conference and at Transport House. If trade union leaders became convinced that Greene's campaign was aimed at extending left-wing power they would close ranks firmly against it.