This chapter explores the interactions between asset ownership and work incentives in a repeated game framework where effort supply and side payments are self-enforced. Incentives are provided by the threat that employment relationships will end through quitting or firing. The model allows flexible transfers among agents and incorporates match-specific investments in physical assets and skills. Two organizational forms are compared: outside ownership, where someone external to the production team owns the firm's physical assets, and joint ownership, where the firm's workforce owns these assets. It is shown that these two ownership systems are equivalent. For every point along the second-best frontier of an outside ownership economy, there is a point on the frontier of a joint ownership economy that gives all agents identical present values, and conversely. This isomorphism arises because the total surplus from the continuation of relationships among input suppliers is identical across the two systems. When an allocation is second-best in an outside ownership economy, it is impossible to obtain a Pareto improvement by switching to joint ownership, and vice versa.