The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention.

It is sometimes objected that if we require that knowers always be able to ground what they know, provided it is not self-evident, then what ordinarily passes for knowledge would be little of the sort. I happen to know, for example, that Alamogordo is north of El Paso, but I doubt that I could establish it from memory: I cannot cite any authoritative map or encyclopaedia where I saw or read it, etc. In spite of this, however, it seems to me that even the traditional account can be defended here. For even though I may not remember what specific evidence I had in coming to know the relative position of the two towns, I can still remember that I once had such evidence, and perhaps what type of evidence it was, and that I have not since then found any contrary evidence. And this, I think, is enough to justify my continuing to believe. Indeed, even just the fact that one seems to remember may be enough for those of us with a good memory.