On Edmund Gettier's interpretation, the Ayer and Chisholm analyses of the concept of knowledge are sufficiently similar to analysis A, below, to be called the same.

Analysis A:

A person S has knowledge that p iff

1. (i) p is true;

2. (ii) S believes that p;

3. (iii) S is justified in believing that p.

Gettier presents us with two counter-examples to this view. I will now briefly set forth the principle of the second, which is both simpler than the first and not essentially different from it qua counter-example to A.

Suppose S has good evidence for his belief that p, from which in turn he deduces that p ∨ q. But, unknown to S, (∼p) & q. So, all three conditions for knowledge specified in the view under examination are fulfilled; but we still do not want to say that S knows that p ∨ q.

Here is a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge, proposed as a solution to the Gettier problem:

1. sj1: There is a set of statements, e1, e2, …, en, each of which S believes to be true.

2. […]