Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-18T04:25:09.590Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

15 - The tu quoque argument and the claims of rationalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2010

Deirdre N. McCloskey
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
Get access

Summary

One of the editorial tasks undertaken by Hausman and McPherson in Economics and Philosophy was a little symposium on The Rhetoric of Economics (in April 1988). Two of the participants, Uskali Mäki and Steven Rappaport, were conventional Methodologists, trained as analytic philosophers.

Least contentious was Uskali Mäki's suggestion that Arjo Klamer and I combine one version of “realism” with rhetoric. Mäki's piece is introduced with a rhetoric of sharp revision — Klamer and I are said to hold “erroneous” beliefs, and the first sentence announces a “critical tone.” But in fact I agree with most of the points he makes, wondering why he would think I would disagree with them; and furthermore I admire his style and good sense. There is not much on which we disagree.

Mäki follows by instinct, as does Rappaport, the “Hippocratic Oath for Pluralists” proposed by Wayne Booth:

II. I will try to publish nothing about any book or article until I have understood it, which is to say, until I have reason to think that I can give an account of it that the author himself will recognize as just. Any attempt at overstanding [sic] will follow this initial act of attempted respect … Paraphrasing Coleridge: Before I damn a critic's errors, I will try to reconstruct his enterprise as if it were my own.

Booth 1979, p. 351, his italics
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×