Michael Rohlf argues that the B-Deduction is part of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the first Critique. Rohlf begins by arguing against the common assumption that the argument for transcendental idealism is contained within the Transcendental Aesthetic. He then develops his interpretation of the B-Deduction’s role. In particular, Rohlf argues that section 26 of the B-Deduction is intended to prove that our representations of space and time are singular. Building on Beatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of section 26 – according to which space and time, as formal intuitions, are first generated by a transcendental synthesis of the imagination under the synthetic unity of apperception – Rohlf further argues that the formal intuition of time supplies the “bare representation of unity as applied to time.” Crucially, Rohlf, argues, this is a condition of assigning schemata to categories and applying these categories to empirical representations.