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Drafts for the Metaphysics of Morals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2020

Frederick Rauscher
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
Kenneth R. Westphal
Affiliation:
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Istanbul
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Summary

DRAFTS OF PREFACES AND INTRODUCTIONS

A. TO THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

[Pagination is from Stark, Nachforschungen]

Loses Blatt Hagen 23. Between February and May, 1794.

1. The laws of actions 2. the maxims of actions. Duties of right and Stark 252 duties of virtue. A. toward itself, B. toward others.

Jus ﹛right﹜ i. The right of humanity in our own person, ii. the right of Stark 253 human beings. Both negative duties, the former as a limiting condition of the possibility of the latter.

Ethica. A. The end of humanity in our own person, B. the end of human beings. Both affirmative duties and extended to the matter of duty of ends. To the first the fitness to all ends, thus to cultivate talents, hence to physical but also to the moral end, namely the conscientious performance of all duties of right out of respect for the law, the cultivation of the disposition for which is a duty of virtue, although the actions themselves are duties of right.

The duties of virtue toward oneself could also be called bodily duties, however not amoris benevolentiae erga se ipsum ﹛benevolent love toward oneself﹜, (for no duties are given for that because each wills his own wellbeing himself) but amoris complacentiae in semet ipso ﹛sympathetic love in himself﹜ in which we are conscious of having fulfilled the physical and moral ends of humanity.

Loses Blatt E 22 [first page] 23:246

All laws of right (concerning what is mine and yours) are analytic (due to freedom) – all laws of ends are synthetic

For ethics: Schema of the division

Lawfulness – moral disposition

Duty of virtue

One's own perfection – others’ happiness

Law – Duty

End

One's own perfection – others’ happiness

All ethical obligation is latus ﹛wide﹜. The extent of performance and the kind is not determinate. – Exceptions are those obligations not to violate the laws of right even if they be merely inward – An end which is made a duty for us by others is impossible, though of course a duty which we make into an end is possible. This end is the morally good in the disposition and the action has morality.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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