Introduction

As discussed at length in Part One, the common sense appeal of instrumental theory is rarely unaccompanied by its substantivist opposite: the view that technology is not just something to be used, but has a determinative impact on social life. This opposition is frequently interpreted as an inversion of the progressive connotations of instrumentalism. ‘What makes substantivism so very gloomy’, Feenberg asserts, is that whereas instrumentalism started out as ‘a cheerful doctrine of progress’, substantivism implies that ‘technology is inherently biased toward domination. Far from correcting its flaws, further advance can only make things worse’ – witness the sense of futility that permeates the philosophy of substantivism as discussed in chapters 1 and 2. The frequent corollary of the substantivist view, then, is that technology, far from being an instrument of human control, is out of control; it now controls us.

To begin to show how this has developed historically, this chapter illustrates the occurrence of this substantivist strain in early debates on missile defence in the United States. It does so by highlighting substantivist understandings and accounts of key issues in relation to missile defence in the period leading up to the ABM treaty of 1972 – the launch of Sputnik and reactions to it, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's attitude towards missile defence, and broader attitudes towards the nuclear arms race.