Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vpsfw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-17T18:38:40.313Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

11 - Just World, Social Responsibility, and Helping Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2009

Michael Ross
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo, Ontario
Dale T. Miller
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

This chapter attempts to integrate research on belief in a just world and social responsibility. First, the concepts of belief in a just world and social responsibility are described in some detail, and common aspects and differences are pointed out. On the basis of this discussion, two hypotheses are derived that refer to the overlap between just world belief and social responsibility and to the prediction of prosocial behavior. In the second part, empirical results that bear on the hypotheses are reported. Finally, some variations in the meaning of belief in a just world are considered, and a possible explanation is offered for the finding that belief in a just world is sometimes positively and sometimes negatively related to prosocial behavior.

Belief in a Just World

Just world theory is one of the key theories in social psychology (Lerner, 1980), and a central component of this is the belief in a just world construct. The belief in a just world may be defined as a belief system that rests on the premise that in general people get what they deserve. This assumption – which certainly is not confirmed in reality – is a positive illusion (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988) and serves as a protection against the possibility that fate is uncontrollable and arbitrary. The development of the belief in a just world is closely linked to the development of a personal contract (Lerner, 1974). The child assumes that the world is a just place.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×