Traditionally, pacifism and just war theory have represented radically opposed responses to aggression. Pacifism has been interpreted to rule out any use of violence in response to aggression. Just war theory has been interpreted to permit a measured use of violence in response to aggression. It has been thought that the two views might sometimes agree in particular cases – for example, that pacifists and just war theorists might unconditionally oppose nuclear war – but beyond that it has been generally held that the two views lead to radically opposed recommendations. In this chapter, by applying a peacemaking model of doing philosophy to the analysis of these two views, I hope to show that this is not the case. Specifically, I will argue that pacifism and just war theory, in their most morally defensible interpretations, can be substantially reconciled both in theory and in practice.

JUST WAR THEORY AND PACIFISM

In traditional just war theory there are two basic elements: an account of just cause and an account of just means. Just cause is usually specified as follows:

1. Then must be substantial aggression.

2. Nonbelligerent correctives must be either hopeless or too costly.

3. Belligerent correctives must be neither hopeless nor too costly.

Needless to say, the notion of substantial aggression is a bit fuzzy, but it is generally understood to be the type of aggression that violates people's most fundamental rights.