John Searle is famous for his description theory of names. Most regard this theory as having been refuted by Kripke. Yet Searle's theory has definite advantages over the Millian and causal alternatives. I show that the advantages are due to his explaining meaning in terms of the contents of mental states. The arguments against descriptivism refute only the claim that the relevant contents are descriptive. We get a better theory of names by keeping Searle's Intentionalism and dropping descriptivism.

SENSE, REFERENCE, AND INTENTIONAL CONTENT

Searle addressed fundamental questions about proper names: Do names have senses? In virtue of what do names refer to objects? How in the utterance of names do speakers succeed in referring to objects? In answering these questions, Searle develops a broadly Fregean account in which the notion of “Intentional content” plays the fundamental role. Searle's basic principle is that the meaning and referential properties of all linguistic units are derived from the intrinsic Intentionality of mental states (1983: vii, 27).