In this study into the nature of Indonesian Islamism, I argued in favour of a nuanced examination of the beliefs and behaviour of Islamist parties in the early democratic period after the end of the New Order. Many scholars of Indonesian Islam have characterized Islamist politics as somewhat monolithic and contrary to the “essence” of Islamic teachings. They, in effect, portrayed Islamism as an undesirable element in a transitional democracy such as Indonesia's. I have critiqued this discourse as biased in its depiction and promotion of Islam as a pluralist-friendly religion and questioned the binary conceptions which it uses to analyze Islamist agendas. I argued that Indonesian Islamism's faithfulness to the constitution and commitment to reformist goals have been far greater than this scholarship suggested. I also highlighted that rather than being clear-cut and unwavering, as many of their critics appear to claim, many other aspects of Islamist politics have rather been contradictory (such as the stance on religious pluralism) and shallow (such as the shari'ah agenda of several parties). Pragmatism, however, has, in most cases, prevailed, due to the need to appear pluralist and pro-reform.

A central theme of the book was the Islamist view that Islam should provide the major cultural and legal framework for Indonesian society. This conviction, to some extent, explains their aim to control the government in order to achieve Muslim supremacy. I further pointed out that Islamist motives originate in a sense of loss of Muslim identity. For Islamists, gaining control of government meant shifting political power away from secular and non-Muslim forces, both of which they see as having accumulated a disproportionately large share of power since colonial times. The objective in controlling government thus meant to counter the long-term effects of colonialism, which had estranged Muslims from Islam and prevented devout Muslims from having a prominent political role in independent Indonesia. Because of this belief, members of Islamist parties are able to explain the electoral success of nationalist and secular parties — such as in the June 1999 and 2004 elections — as being the consequence of a larger transformation of Muslims along Western-secular parameters, together with the West's negative propaganda against shari'ah.