Abdal-Haqq, Irshad. 2002. “Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements.” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 7(1): 27–82.Google Scholar

Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4): 620–52.Google Scholar

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A.. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York, NY: Crown Business.Google Scholar

Ahmed, Dawood I. and Ginsburg, Tom. 2014. “Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions.” Virginia Journal of International Law 54(3): 616–95.Google Scholar

Akerlof, George A. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488–500.Google Scholar

Alchian, Armen A. 1965. “Some Economics of Property Rights.” Il Politico 30: 816–29.Google Scholar

Alchian, Armen A. 1977. Economic Forces at Work. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press.Google Scholar

Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62(5): 777–95.Google Scholar

Alesina, Alberto and Giuliano, Paola. 2015. “Culture and Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature 53(4): 898–944.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. 1991. “What Are Transaction Costs?” Research in Law and Economics 14: 1–18.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. 1998. “Property Rights, Transaction Costs and Coase: One More Time.” In Coasean Economics: Law and Economics and the New Institutional Economics, edited by Medema, Steven G., 105–18. Boston, MA: Kluwer.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. 2000. “Transaction Costs.” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, edited by Bouckaert, Boudewijn and Geest, Gerrit De, 893–926. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. 2006. “Theoretical Difficulties with Transaction Cost Measurement.” Division of Labour and Transaction Costs 2(1): 1–14.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. 2014. “The Coase Theorem: Coherent, Logical, and Not Disproved.” Journal of Institutional Economics 11(2): 1–12.Google Scholar

Allen, Douglas W. and Lueck, Dean. 2003. The Nature of the Farm: Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Almendares, Nicholas and Le Bihan., Patrick 2015. “Increasing Leverage: Judicial Review as a Democracy-Enhancing Institution.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10: 357–90.Google Scholar

Alston, Eric. 2018. “Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution: The Political Economy of Securing an Aspirational Social Contract.” Constitutional Studies 3 (June).Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Eggertson, Thráinn, and North, Douglass C., eds. 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Ferrie, Joseph P.. 1993. “Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State.” American Economic Review 83(4): 852–76.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Ferrie, Joseph P. 1999. Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South, 1865–1965. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Gallo, Andres A.. 2010. “Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina.” Explorations in Economic History 47(2): 179–97.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Gillespie, William. 1989. “Resource Coordination and Transaction Costs: A Framework for Analyzing the Firm/Market Boundary.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11(2): 191–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Harris, Edwyna, and Mueller, Bernardo. 2012. “The Development of Property Rights on Frontiers: Endowments, Norms, and Politics.” Journal of Economic History 72(3): 741–70.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Higgs, Robert. 1982. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests.” Journal of Economic History 42(2): 327–53.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D., and Mueller, Bernardo. 1999a. “A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy in Brazil.” Environment and Development Economics 4: 135–60.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D., and Mueller, Bernardo 1999b. Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D., and Mueller, Bernardo 2000. “Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39(2): 162–88.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D., and Mueller, Bernardo 2010. “Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil.” NBER Working Paper No. 15865, www.nber.org/papers/w15865.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Mattiace, Shannan, and Nonnenmacher, Tomas. 2009. “Coercion, Culture, and Contracts: Labor and Debt on Henequen Haciendas in Yucatán, Mexico, 1870–1915.” The Journal of Economic History 69(1): 104–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Melo, Marcus André, Mueller, Bernardo, and Pereira, Carlos. 2006. “Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Brazil.” Latin American Research Network Working Paper R–509. Washington, DC: Research Division, Inter-American Development Bank.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Alston, Lee J., Melo, Marcus André, Mueller, Bernardo, and Pereira, Carlos 2016. Brazil in Transition: Beliefs, Leadership, and Institutional Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Alston, Lee J. and Mueller, Bernardo. 2006. “Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22(1): 87–114.Google Scholar

Alt, James E. and Lassen, David D.. 2008. “Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments.” Economics and Politics 20(1): 33–61.Google Scholar

Amar, Akhil Reed. 1989. “Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” University of Chicago Law Review 56(2): 443–99.Google Scholar

Ames, B. 1995. “Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress.” The Journal of Politics 57(2): 324–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Ames, B. 2001. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Anderson, Erin and Schmittlein, David C.. 1984. “Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination.” The Rand Journal of Economics 15(3): 385–95.Google Scholar

Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J.. 1975. “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West.” Journal of Law and Economics 18(1): 163–79.Google Scholar

Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, Peter J. 2004. The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Aoki, Masahiko, Binmore, Kenneth, Deakin, Simon, and Gintis, Herbert, eds. 2012. Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar

Argersinger, Peter H. 1980. “‘A Place on the Ballot’: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws.” The American Historical Review 85(2) (April): 287–306.Google Scholar

Argersinger, Peter H. 1991. Structure, Process, and Party. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1968. “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment.” American Economic Review 58(3): 537–39.Google Scholar

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1985. “The Economics of Agency.” In Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, edited by Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J., 37–51. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.Google Scholar

Arruñada, Benito. 2012. “Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework.” International Review of Economics 59(2): 121–44.Google Scholar

Arruñada, Benito, and Andonova, Veneta. 2005. “Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking.” In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edited by Ménard, Claude and Shirley, Mary, 229–50. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Austen-Smith, D. and Riker, William H.. 1987. “Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation.” American Political Science Review 81(3): 897–918.Google Scholar

Backhouse, Roger E. and Medema, Steven G.. 2009. “Retrospectives: On the Definition of Economics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1): 221–34.Google Scholar

Baker, George P., Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin J.. 2008. “Strategic Alliances: Bridges between ‘Islands of Conscious Power.’” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2): 146–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Banks, Jeffrey S. 1991. Signaling Games in Political Science. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.Google Scholar

Barbera, S. and Jackson, M. O.. 2004. “Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3): 1011–48.Google Scholar

Baron, David P. 1989. “Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(1): 45–72.Google Scholar

Baron, David P. 1994. “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters.” American Political Science Review 88(1): 33–47.Google Scholar

Baron, David P. 2002. “Review of Grossman and Helpman’s Special Interest Politics.” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (December): 1221–29.Google Scholar

Baron, David P. 2005. “Competing for the Public through the News Media.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 14(2): 339–76.Google Scholar

Barzel, Yoram. 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Barzel, Yoram 1997. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Baum, Lawrence. 2009. Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Baumgartner, F. R., Jones, B. D., and Mortensen, P. B.. 2014. “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policy Making.” In Theories of the Policy Process, edited by Sabatier, P. A. and Weible, C. M., 59–104. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar

Becker, Gary S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Becker, Marc. 2011. “Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador.” Latin American Perspectives 38(1): 47–62.Google Scholar

Becker, Marc 2013. “The Stormy Relations between Rafael Correa and Social Movements in Ecuador.” Latin American Perspectives 40(3): 43–62.Google Scholar

Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. The Process of Government. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Bernheim, B. Douglas and Whinston, Michael D.. 1986. “Common Agency.” Econometrica 54(4): 923–42.Google Scholar

Bernstein, Lisa. 1992. “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry.” Journal of Legal Studies 21(1): 115–57.Google Scholar

Bernstein, Lisa 2015. “Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts.” Journal of Legal Analysis 7(2): 561–621.Google Scholar

Bertrand, Elodie. 2006. “The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 30(3): 389–402.Google Scholar

Besley, Timothy and Burgess, Robin. 2001. “Political Agency, Government Responsiveness and the Role of the Media.” European Economic Review 45(4–6): 629–40.Google Scholar

Besley, Timothy, Burgess, Robin, and Prat, Andrea. 2002. “Mass Media and Political Accountability.” In The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, edited by Islam, Roumeen, 45–60. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.Google Scholar

Bettencourt, Luis M. A. 2013. “The Origins of Scaling in Cities.” Science 340: 1438–41.Google Scholar

Bird, R. M. 1992. Tax Policy and Economic Development. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar

Black, D. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Bolt, J. and van Zanden, J. L.. 2014. “The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts.” The Economic History Review 67(3): 627–51.Google Scholar

Borjas, George J. 1978. “Discrimination in HEW: Is the Doctor Sick or Are the Patients Healthy?” Journal of Law and Economics 21(1): 97–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Botero, Juan C. and Ponce, Alejandro. 2010. “Measuring the Rule of Law.” The World Justice Project – Working Paper Series WPS No. 001, Washington, DC.Google Scholar

Boudreaux, Donald J. 2014. “Liberty Matters: Deirdre McCloskey and Economists’ Ideas about Ideas.” Liberty Fund. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2628.Google Scholar

Bowen, James D. 2010. “Ecuador’s 2009 Presidential and Legislative Elections.” Electoral Studies 29(1): 186–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Bresnahan, Timothy and Levin, Jonathan. 2013. “Vertical Integration and Market Structure.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 853–90. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Broadberry, Stephen and Wallis, John Joseph. 2016. “Growing, Shrinking and Long Run Economic Performance: Historical Perspectives on Economic Development.” Working Paper.Google Scholar

Brousseau, Eric and Glachant, Jean-Michel, eds. 2002. The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Brousseau, Eric and Glachant, Jean-Michel eds. 2008. New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Buchanan, James M. 1985. “The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing.” Economic Inquiry 23 (January): 1–6.Google Scholar

Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Calabresi, Guido. 1965. “The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs.” Harvard Law Review 78(4): 713–45.Google Scholar

Caldeira, Gregory A., and Wright, John R.. 1998. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate.” American Journal of Political Science 42(2): 499–523.Google Scholar

Canes-Wrone, B. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science 47(2): 205–14.Google Scholar

Cappelletti, Mauro. 1989. The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Carugati, Federica. 2018. “Constitution and Consensus: The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Stability.” Working Paper, Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University.Google Scholar

Center for Constitutional Transitions. 2013. “Justice Albie Sachs Discusses His Role ‘Judging the Judges after Transition’ in Kenya.” April 16. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/albie-sachs-summary/.Google Scholar

Cheibub, J. A. 2006. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., and Ginsburg, T.. 2013. “Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism.” British Journal of Political Science 44(3): 515–44.Google Scholar

Cheung, Steven. 1983. “The Contractual Nature of the Firm.” Journal of Law and Economics 26(1): 1–21.Google Scholar

Cheung, Steven 1989. “Economic Organization and Transaction Costs.” In Allocation, Information and Markets, edited by Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray, and Newman, Peter, 77–82. London: MacMillan.Google Scholar

Choi, Stephen J., Mitu Gulati, G., and Posner, Eric A.. 2010. “Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected rather than Appointed Judiciary.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 26(2): 290–336.Google Scholar

Clark, Tom S. 2011. “The Public and Judicial Independence.” In The Politics of Judicial Independence, edited by Peabody, Bruce, 123–46. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4: 386–405.Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (October): 1–44.Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald H. 1974. “The Lighthouse in Economics.” Journal of Law and Economics 17(24): 357–76.Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald H. 1988. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald H. 1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production.” American Economic Review 82(4): 713–19.Google Scholar

Coate, Stephen and Morris, Stephen. 1995. “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interest.” Journal of Political Economy 106(6): 1210–35.Google Scholar

Comparative Constitutions Project. 2016. http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.Google Scholar

Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. 2005. “The Final Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission.” Nairobi: Government Printer.Google Scholar

Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 1963 (as amended to 2008), art. 61, par. 2.Google Scholar

Cooter, Robert D. and Ulen, Thomas. 2011. Law and Economics. 6th edn. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley.Google Scholar

Costello, George. 2005. “The Supreme Court’s Overruling of Constitutional Precedent: An Overview.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.Google Scholar

Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Matthew D.. 2000. “The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes.” In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Haggard, Stephan and McCubbins, Mathew, 21–63. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Matthew D. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Matthew D. 2007. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. 2nd edn. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Crawford, Sue E. S. and Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 89(3): 582–600.Google Scholar

Cross, H. L. 1953. The People’s Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

Crouch, Melissa and Lindsey, Tim, eds. 2014. Law, Society and Transition in Myanmar. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.Google Scholar

CRP (Center for Responsive Politics). 2015. “Money in Marijuana.” November. www.opensecrets.org/news/issues/marijuana/.Google Scholar

Culp, Peter W., Glennon, Robert Jerome, and Libecap, Gary. 2014. Shopping for Water: How the Market Can Mitigate Water Shortages in the American West. Washington, DC: Island Press.Google Scholar

Dahlman, Carl J. 1979. “The Problem of Externality.” Journal of Law and Economics 22(1): 141–62.Google Scholar

Daly, Yvonne M. 2011. “Judicial Oversight of Policing: Investigations, Evidence and the Exclusionary Rule.” Crime, Law and Social Change 55(2): 199–215.Google Scholar

Danziger, Shai, Levav, Jonathan, and Liora, Avnaim-Pesso. 2011. “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(17): 6889–92.Google Scholar

Della Paolera, Gerardo and Taylor, Alan M.. 1998. “Finance and Development in an Emerging Market: Argentina in the Interwar Period.” In Latin America and the World Economy since 1800, edited by Coatsworth, John H. and Taylor, Alan M., 139–70. Series on Latin American Studies. Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies; distributed by Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Della Paolera, Gerardo and Taylor, Alan M. 1999. “Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime.” Journal of Economic History 59(3): 567–99.Google Scholar

Della Paolera, Gerardo and Taylor, Alan M. 2001. “Bailing Out: Internal versus External Convertibility.” In Straining at the Anchor: The Argentine Currency Board and the Search for Macroeconomic Stability, 1880–1935, edited by Paolera, Gerardo della and Taylor, Alan M., 165–87. National Bureau of Economic Research Series on Long-Term Factors in Economic Development. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Del Rosal, Ignacio. 2011. “The Empirical Measurement of Rent-Seeking Costs.” Journal of Economic Surveys 25(2): 298–325.Google Scholar

Demsetz, Harold. 1967. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 57 (May): 347–59.Google Scholar

Denzau, Arthur T. and Munger, Michael C.. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” American Political Science Review 80(1): 89–106.Google Scholar

De Soto, Hernando. 1989. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York, NY: HarperCollins.Google Scholar

De Soto, Hernando 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York, NY: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F. 1970. Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Dixit, Avinash. 1996. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy 65(2): 135–50.Google Scholar

Downs, Anthony 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.Google Scholar

Drobak, John N. and Nye, John V. C., eds. 1997. The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.Google Scholar

Dunbar, R. I. M. 1993. “Coevolution of Neocortical Size, Group Size and Language in Humans.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16(4): 681–735.Google Scholar

Dunleavy, P. 2012. “Duverger’s Law Is a Dead Parrot. Outside the USA, First-Past-the-Post Voting Has No Tendency At All to Produce Two Party Politics.” http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/duvergers-law-dead-parrot-dunleavy/.Google Scholar

Dunleavy, P. and Diwakar, R.. 2013. “Analysing Multiparty Competition in Plurality Rule Elections.” Party Politics 19(6): 855–86.Google Scholar

Duverger, Maurice. 1963. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar

Eggertsson, Thráinn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Eggertsson, Thráinn 2005. Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Elkins, Zachary, Ginsburg, Tom, and Melton, James. 2009. The Endurance of National Constitutions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Elliott, Mark. 2001. The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review. Oxford: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar

Ellis, Joseph J. 2015. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution, 1783–1789. New York, NY: Knopf.Google Scholar

Elster, Jon. 2007. Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Engdahl, David E. 1992. “John Marshall’s ‘Jeffersonian’ Concept of Judicial Review.” Duke Law Journal 42: 279–339.Google Scholar

Engerman, Stanley L. and Sokoloff, Kenneth L.. 2012. Economic Development in the Americas since 1500: Endowments and Institutions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Engstrom, Erik J. and Kernell, Samuel. 2005. “Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940.” American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 531–49.Google Scholar

Epstein, D. and O’Halloran, S.. 2001. “Legislative Organization under Separate Powers.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2): 373–96.Google Scholar

Epstein, L., Landes, W. M., and Posner, R. A.. 2013. The Behavior of Federal Judges. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Epstein, Richard. 1990. “The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory.” Brigham Young University Law Review 1990(3): 827–55.Google Scholar

Eskridge, William N. 1991. “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions.” Yale Law Journal 101: 331–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fehr, Ernst and Gintis, Herbert. 2007. “Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations.” Annual Review of Sociology 33: 43–64.Google Scholar

Ferejohn, John A. 1995. “Foreword.” In Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, edited by Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R., ix–xiii. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Figueiredo, A. C. and Limongi, F.. 1996. “Congresso Nacional: Organização, Processo Legislativo e Produção Legal.” Cadernos de Pesquisa 5.Google Scholar

Figueiredo, A. C. and Limongi, F. 2000. “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil.” Comparative Politics 32: 151–70.Google Scholar

Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2014. “What You Should Know about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview.” Project Management Journal 45(2): 6–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco. 2006. “Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis.” International Review of Law and Economics 26(4): 519–35.Google Scholar

Foss, Nicolai J., Lando, Henrik, and Thomsen, Steen. 2000. “The Theory of the Firm.” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume 3: The Regulation of Contracts, edited by Bouckaert, Boudewijn and Geest, Gerrit De, 631–58. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Frisman, P. 2008. “Connecticut’s Littering Law.” OLR Research Report, May 20, 2008, www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0314.htm.Google Scholar

Fuller, Lon L. 1977. The Morality of Law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf, eds. 1991. The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Heidelberg, Germany: Mohr Siebeck.Google Scholar

Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf. 2005. Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. 2nd edn. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Gabaix, Xavier. 2016. “Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 30(1): 185–206.Google Scholar

Gainer, Maya. 2016. “Transforming the Courts: Judicial Sector Reforms in Kenya, 2011–2015.” OGP-ISS Case Study. https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/MG_OGP_Kenya.pdf.Google Scholar

Galiani, Sebastian and Sened, Itai, eds. 2014. Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Gardbaum, Stephen. 2014. “Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in Established Democracies.” American Journal of Comparative Law 62(3): 613–39.Google Scholar

Gardner, Bruce. 1983. “Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65(2) (May): 225–34.Google Scholar

Garlicki, Lech. 2007. “Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 5(1): 44–68.Google Scholar

Garoupa, Nuno and Ginsburg, Tom. 2015. Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Gathii, James Thuo. 2016. The Contested Empowerment of Kenya’s Judiciary, 2010–2015: A Historical Institutional Analysis. Sheria Publishing House.Google Scholar

Gely, Rafael and Spiller, Pablo T.. 1990. “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the ‘State Farm’ and ‘Grove City Cases’.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6(2): 263–300.Google Scholar

Gerken, H. K. 2013. “Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty.” Duke Law Journal 62: 1349–86.Google Scholar

Gibbons, Robert. 2005. “Four Formal(Izable) Theories of the Firm?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58(2): 200–45.Google Scholar

Gibbons, Robert and Henderson, Rebecca. 2012. “What Do Managers Do?” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 680–731. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, eds. 2013. The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2005. “The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598(1): 84–101.Google Scholar

Gilligan, T. W. and Krehbiel, K.. 1987. “Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(2): 287–335.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom. 2003. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom 2010. “Public Choice and Constitutional Design.” In Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, edited by Farber, Daniel and O’Connell, Anne Joseph, 261–82. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom 2011. “Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3(2): 269–80.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom and Huq, Aziz. 2018. “The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Implementation.” In From Parchment to Practice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom and Simpser, Alberto, eds. 2013. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Ginsburg, Tom and Versteeg, Mila. 2014. “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30(3): 587–622.Google Scholar

Glaeser, Edward L. and Shleifer, Andrei. 2003. “The Rise of the Regulatory State.” Journal of Economic Literature 41(2): 401–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Glynn, Adam and Sen, Maya. 2015. “Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?” American Journal of Political Science 59(1): 37–54.Google Scholar

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Sunder, Shyam. 1997. “What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2): 603–30.Google Scholar

Godinho, Vitorino M. 1965. Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial. Vols. I, II, III. Lisbon: Editora Arcádia.Google Scholar

Goldberg, Victor P. and Erickson, John R.. 1987. “Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke.” Journal of Law and Economics 30(2): 369–98.Google Scholar

Greif, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” American Economic Review 83(3): 525–48.Google Scholar

Greif, Avner 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Greif, Avner and Kingston, Christopher. 2011. “Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?” In Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy, and Voting, edited by Schofield, N. and Caballero, G., 13–43. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar

Groseclose, T. 1994. “Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress.” The Journal of Politics 56(2): 440–58.Google Scholar

Groseclose, T. and King, D. C.. 2001. “Committee Theories Reconsidered.” In Congress Reconsidered, 7th edn., edited by Dodd, L. C. and Oppenheimer, B. I.. Washington, DC: CQ Press.Google Scholar

Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. 2001. Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D.. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 691–719.Google Scholar

Guardiola, Jorge and Fernando, Garcia-Quero. 2014. “Buen Vivir (living well) in Ecuador: Community and Environmental Satisfaction without Household Material Prosperity?” Ecological Economics 107: 177–84.Google Scholar

Gudynas, Eduardo. 2009. “The Political Ecology of the Biocentric Turn in Ecuador’s New Constitution.” Revista de Estudios Sociales no. 32 (January/April): 34–46.Google Scholar

Guerra, Kristine. 2016. “‘Intolerable’: Judge Reprimanded After She ‘Berated and Belittled’ Domestic-Violence Victim.” Washington Post, September 1.Google Scholar

Hadfield, Gillian K. 2005. “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments.” In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edited by Ménard, Claude and Shirley, Mary, 175–203. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Hadfield, Gillian K. 2016. Rules for a Flat World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hadfield, Gillian K. and Weingast, Barry R.. 2012. “What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order.” Journal of Legal Analysis 4(2) (December): 471–514.Google Scholar

Hadfield, Gillian K. and Weingast, Barry R. 2013. “Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment.” Journal of Law and Courts 1(1): 3–34.Google Scholar

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.Google Scholar

Hall, J. A. 1985. Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

Hallerberg, M. and Marier, P.. 2001. “Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries.” ZEI Working Paper. ZEI – Center for European Integration Studies.Google Scholar

Hammond, T. H. and Knott, J. H.. 1996. “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12(1): 119–66.Google Scholar

Shugerman, Handelsman, Jed, . 2012. The People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hansmann, Henry. 1988. “Ownership of the Firm.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4(2): 267–304.Google Scholar

Hansmann, Henry 1996. The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hansmann, Henry 2013a. “All Firms Are Cooperatives – and So Are Governments.” Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity 2(2): 1–10.Google Scholar

Hansmann, Henry 2013b. “Ownership and Organizational Form.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 891–917. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Hansmann, Henry 2016. “Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart.” In The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, edited by Aghion, Phillipe, Dewatripont, Mathias, Legros, Patrick, and Zingales, Luigi, 307–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2004. “Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?” American Economic Review 94(3): 712–29.Google Scholar

Hart, H. L. A. 2012. The Concept of Law. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hart, Oliver D. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John. 1990. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 98(6): 1119–58.Google Scholar

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35: 519–30.Google Scholar

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1978. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Hayes, Thomas C. 1990. “Confrontation in the Gulf: The Oilfield Lying Below the Iraq-Kuwait Dispute.” New York Times, September 3.Google Scholar

Helmholz, Richard. 2009. “Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature.” Journal of Legal Analysis 1(1): 325–26.Google Scholar

Helper, Susan and Henderson, Rebecca. 2014. “Management Practices, Relational Contracts, and the Decline of General Motors.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(1): 49–72.Google Scholar

Hennart, Jean-Francois. 1993. “Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions Are a Mix of ‘Market’ and ‘Hierarchy’.” Organization Science 4(4): 529–47.Google Scholar

Higgs, Robert. 1996. “Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington Salmon Fishery.” In Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, edited by Alston, Lee J., Eggertsson, Thráinn, and North, Douglass C., 247–79. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Hirschl, Ran. 2009. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Hirschman, Albert O. 1984. “Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse.” American Economic Review 74(2): 89–96.Google Scholar

Hochfelder, David. 1999. “Taming the Lightning: American Telegraphy as a Revolutionary Technology, 1832–1860.” PhD diss., Case Western Reserve University.Google Scholar

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1988. Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2003. Recent Developments in Institutional Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2007. “Meanings of Methodological Individualism.” Journal of Economic Methodology 12(2): 211–26.Google Scholar

Hoekstra, V. and LaRowe, N.. 2013. “Judging Nominees: An Experimental Test of the Impact of Qualifications and Divisiveness on Public Support for Nominees to the Federal Courts.” Justice System Journal 34(1): 38–61.Google Scholar

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. 1913. “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.” The Yale Law Journal 23(1): 16–59.Google Scholar

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. 1917. “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.” The Yale Law Journal 26(8): 710–70.Google Scholar

Holmström, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul. 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Special issue, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 24–51.Google Scholar

Holmström, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul 1994. “The Firm as an Incentive System.” American Economic Review 84(4): 972–91.Google Scholar

Howard, R. M. and Nixon, D. C.. 2002. “Regional Court Influence over Bureaucratic Policymaking: Courts, Ideological Preferences, and the Internal Revenue Service.” Political Research Quarterly 55(4): 907–22.Google Scholar

Howard, R. M. and Nixon, D. C. 2003. “Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service.” Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 13: 233–56.Google Scholar

Howell, William G. 2003. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Huber, J. D. and Shipan, C. R.. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Hughes, Jonathan R.T. 1976. Social Control in the Colonial Economy. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.Google Scholar

Inman, R. and Fitts, M.. 1990. “Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the US Historical Record.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 79–132.Google Scholar

Iyigun, Murat and Rubin, Jared. 2017. “The Ideological Roots of Institutional Change.” IZA Working Paper No. 10703, April. Bonn, Germany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics.Google Scholar

Jackson, Vicki. 2012. “Judicial Independence: Structure, Context, Attitude.” In Judicial Independence in Transition: Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Region, edited by Seibert-Fohr, Anja, 19–86. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Jacob, Brian A. and Levitt, Steven D.. 2003. “Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(3): 843–77.Google Scholar

Jarrell, Gregg A. 1978. “The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics 21(2) (October): 269–95.Google Scholar

Jefferson, Thomas. 1904–1905. “To William Charles Jarvis [September 28, 1820].” In The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, vol. 12. New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.Google Scholar

Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H.. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305–60.Google Scholar

Johnson, R. N. and Libecap, G. D.. 1994. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Jones, Bryan D. and Baumgartner, Frank R.. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Jones, E. L. 1981. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Joskow, Paul L. 1985. “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1(1): 33–80.Google Scholar

Joskow, Paul L. 1987. “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets.” American Economic Review 77(1): 168–85.Google Scholar

Joskow, Paul L. and Noll, Roger G.. 1981. “Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview.” In Studies in Public Regulation, edited by Fromm, Gary, 1–78. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board. 2016. “Vetting of Judges and Magistrates in Kenya: Final Report.” www.jmvb.or.ke/?wpdmdl=1270.Google Scholar

“Judiciary Transformation Framework: 2012–2016.” 2012. Registrar of the Judiciary. www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/assets/downloads/reports/Judiciary’s%20Tranformation%20Framework-fv.pdf.Google Scholar

Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A.. 1984. “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review 74(3) (June): 279–300.Google Scholar

Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A. 1990. “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Journal of Law and Economics 33(1) (April): 103–31.Google Scholar

Kaplow, Louis. 1986. “An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions.” Harvard Law Review 99(3): 517–19.Google Scholar

Kastellec, Jonathan P., Lax, Jeffrey R., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2010. “Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees.” The Journal of Politics 72(3): 767–84.Google Scholar

Kaufmann, Patrick J. and Lafontaine, Francine. 1994. “Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s Franchisees.” Journal of Law and Economics 37(2): 417–53.Google Scholar

Keele, Denise M., Malmsheimer, Robert W., Floyd, Donald W., and Zhang, Lianjun. 2009. “An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6(1): 213–39.Google Scholar

Kennedy, J. B. 2015. “‘Do This! Do That!’ and Nothing Will Happen: Executive Orders and Bureaucratic Responsiveness.” American Politics Research 43(1): 59–82.Google Scholar

Khan, Zorina. 2005. The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790–1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Khan, Zorina and Sokoloff, Kenneth L.. 2001. “The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(3): 233–46.Google Scholar

Kiewiet, R. D. and McCubbins, M. D.. 1994. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Kim, Jongwook and Mahoney, Joseph T.. 2005. “Property Rights Theory, Transaction Costs Theory, and Agency Theory: An Organizational Economics Approach to Strategic Management.” Managerial and Decision Economics 26(4): 223–42.Google Scholar

King, , The Honourable L. J., AQ CQ. 2002–2003. “Removal of Judges.” Flinders Journal of Law Reform 6(2): 169–83.Google Scholar

Kiser, Edgar and Barzel, Yoram. 1991. “The Origins of Democracy in England.” Rationality and Society 3(4): 396–422.Google Scholar

Klein, Benjamin. 1980. “Transaction Cost Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements.” American Economic Review 70(2): 356–62.Google Scholar

Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G., and Alchian, Armen A.. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21(2) (October): 297–326.Google Scholar

Klein, Peter G. 2005. “The Make-Or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies.” In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edited by Ménard, Claude and Shirley, Mary M., 435–64. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Klein, Peter G. and Sykuta, Michael E.. 2010. The Edward Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar.Google Scholar

Kosová, Renatá and Lafontaine, Francine. 2012. “Much Ado about Chains: A Research Agenda.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 30(3): 303–8.Google Scholar

Krehbiel, K. 1992. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Kuran, Timur. 2011. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Lakner, Christoph and Milanovic, Branko. 2016. “Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession.” World Bank Economic Review 30(2): 203–32.Google Scholar

Landes, D. S. 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York, NY: Norton.Google Scholar

Landes, Elisabeth M. 1982. “Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents.” Journal of Law and Economics 25(1) (April): 49–65.Google Scholar

La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Pop-Eleches, Cristian, and Shleifer, Andrei. 2004. “Judicial Checks and Balances.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (April): 445–70.Google Scholar

La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, and Shleifer, Andrei. 2008. “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature 46(2): 285–332.Google Scholar

Law, David S. and Versteeg, Mila. 2011. “The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism.” California Law Review 99: 1163–257.Google Scholar

Law, David S. and Versteeg, Mila 2013. “Sham Constitutions.” California Law Review 101(4): 863–952.Google Scholar

Leflar, Robert A. 1961. “Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions.” Columbia Law Review 61(5): 810–20.Google Scholar

Levy, Brian and Spiller, Pablo T.. 1996. Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Lewis, David K. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. 1989. Contracting for Property Rights. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. 1992. “The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust.” Economic Inquiry 30(2): 242–62.Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. 2007. “The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy.” The Journal of Economic History 67(2): 257–91.Google Scholar

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Lijphart, Arend 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Lim, Claire S. H. 2013. “Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges.” American Economic Review 103(4): 1360–97.Google Scholar

Linneman, Peter. 1980. “The Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard.” Journal of Law and Economics 23(2) (October): 461–79.Google Scholar

Linz, J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1(1) (Winter): 51–69.Google Scholar

Lott, John R., Jr. 1997. “Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: Or, Why the Difference between the Chicago and Virginia Schools Is Really an Elasticity Question.” Public Choice 91(3/4): 219–27.Google Scholar

Ludington, Arthur C. 1911. American Ballot Laws, 1888–1910. Albany: New York State Library.Google Scholar

Lueck, Dean and Miceli, Thomas. 2007. “Property Law.” In Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, 183–257. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar

Maddison Project. 2013. www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm.Google Scholar

Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 198–228.Google Scholar

Mainwaring, Scott 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar

Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew S.. 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Makadok, Richard and Coff, Russell. 2009. “Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms.” The Academy of Management Review 34(2): 297–319.Google Scholar

Maliti, Tom. 2012. “Four Kenyan Appeals Court Judges Declared Unfit for Office.” International Justice Monitor. www.ijmonitor.org/2012/04/four-kenyan-appeals-court-judges-declared-unfit-for-office/.Google Scholar

Manne, Henry. 1997. “The Judiciary and Free Markets.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 21(1): 11–37.Google Scholar

Marchand, James R. and Russell, Keith P.. 1973. “Externalities, Liability, Separability, and Resource Allocation.” American Economic Review 63(4): 611–20.Google Scholar

Martimort, D. 1996. “Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory.” RAND Journal of Economics 27(1): 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Masten, Scott E. 1988. “A Legal Basis for the Firm.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4(1): 181–98.Google Scholar

Masten, Scott E. and Snyder, Edward A.. 1993. “United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits.” Journal of Law and Economics 36(1): 33–70.Google Scholar

Mattiace, Shannan and Nonnenmacher, Tomas. 2014. “The Organization of Hacienda Labor during the Mexican Revolution: Evidence from Yucatán.” Mexican Studies-Estudios Mexicanos 30(2): 366–96.Google Scholar

McCarty, Nolan. 2004. “The Appointments Dilemma.” American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 413–28.Google Scholar

McCloskey, Deidre. 1998. “The So-Called Coase Theorem.” Eastern Economic Journal 24(3): 367–71.Google Scholar

McCloskey, Deidre 2006. The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

McCloskey, Deidre 2010. Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

McCloskey, Deidre 2016. Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

McCubbins, Matthew D., Noll, Roger G., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8(2): 243–77.Google Scholar

McCubbins, Matthew D., Noll, Roger G., and Weingast, Barry R. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75(2): 431–82.Google Scholar

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Schwartz, Thomas. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 165–79.Google Scholar

McGuire, Robert A. 2003. To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Bodies.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–82.Google Scholar

McKelvey, Richard D. 1979. “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models.” Econometrica 47(5): 1085–112.Google Scholar

McNamara, Paul. 2006. “Deontic Logic.” In The Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 7: Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 197–288. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Press.Google Scholar

Medema, Steven G. 1999. “Legal Fiction: The Place of the Coase Theorem in Law and Economics.” Economics and Philosophy 15(2): 209–33.Google Scholar

Medema, Steven G. and Zerbe, Richard O. Jr. 2000. “The Coase Theorem.” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume 1: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics, edited by Bouckaert, Boudewijn and Geest, Gerrit De, 836–92: Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Ménard, Claude. 2013. “Hybrid Modes of Organization: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other Strange Animals.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 1066–1108. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Ménard, Claude and Raynaud, Emmanuel. 2010. “Ulysses and the Sirens: Hands-Tying Governance in Hybrid Forms.” Working Paper, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne.Google Scholar

Ménard, Claude and Shirley, Mary M., eds. 2005. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Merrill, Thomas W. and Smith, Henry E.. 2011. “Making Coasean Property More Coasean.” Journal of Law and Economics 54(4): S77–S104.Google Scholar

Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John. 1990. “Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity.” In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by Alt, James E. and Shepsle, Kenneth A., 57–89. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Miller, Gary J. 2005. “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models.” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 203–25.Google Scholar

Mishan, E. J. 1967. “Pareto Optimality and the Law.” Oxford Economic Papers 19(3): 255–87.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79(4): 1094–116.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. 1987. “An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 12(4): 475–520.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. 2013. “Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 1148–81. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. and Howell, William G.. 1999a. “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(1): 132–79.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. and Howell, William G. 1999b. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29(4): 850–73.Google Scholar

Moe, Terry M. and Wilson, S.. 1994. “Presidents and the Politics of Structure.” Law and Contemporary Problems 57 (Spring): 1–44.Google Scholar

Mokyr, Joel. 2012. The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700–1850. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Mokyr, Joel 2017. A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Moser, Petra. 2005. “How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs.” American Economic Review 95(4): 1214–36.Google Scholar

Mossoff, Adam. 2014. “O’Reilly v. Morse.” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper no. 14–22. www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1422.pdf.Google Scholar

Mueller, Bernardo. 1998. “The Economic Theory of Regulation: The Case of Agrarian Reform Legislation in Brazil.” Revista Brasileira de Economia 52(1) (January/March): 83–110.Google Scholar

Mueller, Bernardo and Ayello Leite, João Gabriel. 2016. “Coevolution of Institutions and Culture in 16th Century Portuguese Empire.” Working Paper, University of Brasilia.Google Scholar

Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Muris, T. J. 1986. “Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control.” Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 884–89.Google Scholar

Myerson, R. B. 2008. “Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory.” American Economic Review 98(3): 586–603.Google Scholar

Neustadt, R. E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York, NY: Free Press.Google Scholar

Nichols, Lionel. 2015. The International Criminal Court and the End of Impunity in Kenya. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. New York, NY: Aldine-Atherton.Google Scholar

Niskanen, William A. 1975. “Bureaucrats and Politicians.” Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December): 617–43.Google Scholar

“Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, 1991 – Press Release.” Nobel Media. www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/press.html.Google Scholar

Noll, Roger G. 1989a. “Comments on Peltzman’s: ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation’.” Special issue, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 48–58.Google Scholar

Noll, Roger G. 1989b. “Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, edited by Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R. D., 1253–87. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.Google Scholar

Noonan, John Thomas. 2005. A Church that Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. 1989. “Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction.” World Development 17(9): 1319–32.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. 1992. “Institutions and Economic Theory.” The American Economist 36(1) (Spring): 3–6.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. and Thomas, Robert P.. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C., Wallis, John Joseph, and Weingast, Barry R.. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R.. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803–32.Google Scholar

Ober, Josiah. 2017. Demopolis: Democracy before Liberalism in Theory and Practice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Ordeshook, Peter C. and Shvetsova, Olga V.. 1994. “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 38(1): 100–23.Google Scholar

Ortiz Crespo, Santiago. 2008. “Citizen Participation: The Constitution of 1998 and the New Constitutional Project.” Revista de Ciencias Sociales 32 (September): 13–17.Google Scholar

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Ostrom, Elinor 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Ostrom, Vincent. 1991. The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.Google Scholar

Overby, L. M., Henschen, B. M., Walsh, M. H., and Strauss, J.. 1992. “Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas.” American Political Science Review 86(4): 997–1003.Google Scholar

Owens, Ryan J., Walters, Daniel E., Black, Ryan C., and Madonna, Anthony. 2014. “Ideology, Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations.” University of Illinois Law Review 2014(2): 347–88.Google Scholar

Ozielo, Ojonnia. 2010. “Judicial Integrity and the Vetting Process in Kenya.” Amani Papers 1(6). UNDP Kenya. www.ke.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Amani%20Papers/AP_Volume1_n6_Sept2010.pdf.Google Scholar

Pachano, Simón. 2010. “Ecuador: New Political System into Operation.” Revista de Ciencia Política 30(2): 297–317.Google Scholar

Parisi, Francesco and Fon, Vincy. 2009. The Economics of Lawmaking. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Parliament of Australia. 2012. “Completed Inquiries 2010–2013: Chapter 1.” Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/2010–13/judicialcomplaints/report/c01.Google Scholar

Pashigian, Peter P. 1976. “Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities.” The Journal of Political Economy 84(6) (August): 1239–59.Google Scholar

Pashigian, Peter P. 1985. “Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?” Economic Inquiry 23 (October): 551–84.Google Scholar

Pauly, Mark V. 1968. “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment.” American Economic Review 58(3): 531–37.Google Scholar

Paz, y Miño Cepeda, Juan. 2009. “El Gobierno de Rafael Correa: Un nuevo ciclo en la historia de Ecuador” [The government of Rafael Correa: A new cycle in the history of Ecuador]. Metapolítica 65: 71–76.Google Scholar

Peabody, Bruce. 2011. The Politics of Judicial Independence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Peltzman, Sam. 1973. “An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments.” Journal of Political Economy 81(5): 1049–91.Google Scholar

Peltzman, Sam 1975. “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation.” Journal of Political Economy 83(4): 677–726.Google Scholar

Peltzman, Sam 1976. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August): 211–40.Google Scholar

Peltzman, Sam 1989. “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation.” Special issue, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 1–59.Google Scholar

Pereira, Carlos and Mueller, Bernardo. 2000. “Uma teoria da preponderância do poder Executivo: O sistema de comissões no Legislativo brasileiro.” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 15(43): 45–67.Google Scholar

Pereira, Carlos and Mueller, Bernardo 2004. “The Cost of Governing Strategic Behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil’s Budgetary Process.” Comparative Political Studies 37(7): 781–815.Google Scholar

Peretti, Terri Jennings. 2002. “Does Judicial Independence Exist?: The Lessons of Social Science Research.” In Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Burbank, Stephen B. and Friedman, Barry, 103–33. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Google Scholar

Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York, NY: Viking.Google Scholar

Plott, Charles R. 1967. “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule.” American Economic Review 57: 787–806.Google Scholar

Plum Book. 2012. Policy and Supporting Positions. Washington, DC: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.Google Scholar

Popper, Karl. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge.Google Scholar

Posin, Daniel Q. 1990. “The Coase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly.” Wayne Law Review 37(1): 89–120.Google Scholar

Posner, Richard A. 1974. “Theories of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2): 335–58.Google Scholar

Posner, Richard A. 1998. “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law.” Stanford Law Review 50: 1551–75.Google Scholar

Posner, Richard A. 2005. “Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach.” Florida State University Law Review 32: 1259–79.Google Scholar

Posner, Richard A. and Parisi, Francesco, eds. 1997. Law and Economics, Volume 1: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Elgar.Google Scholar

Posner, Richard A. and Rasmusen, Eric. 1999. “Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions.” International Review of Law and Economics 19: 369–82.Google Scholar

Poterba, J. M. 1994. “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics.” Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 799–821.Google Scholar

Prendergast, Canice. 2007. “The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats.” American Economic Review 97(1): 180–96.Google Scholar

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., and Limongi, F.. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Radcliffe, Sarah A. 2012. “Development for a Postneoliberal Era? Sumak Kawsay, Living Well and the Limits to Decolonisation in Ecuador.” Geoforum 43: 240–49.Google Scholar

Rakove, Jack, Ruttan, Andrew, and Weingast, Barry R.. 2004. “Ideas, Interests, and Credible Commitments in the American Revolution.” Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, August.Google Scholar

Report of the Committee of the Administration of Justice. 1998. Nairobi: Government Printer.Google Scholar

Report of the Integrity and Anticorruption Committee. 2003. Nairobi: Government Printer.Google Scholar

Richter, Rudolf. 2015. Essays on New Institutional Economics. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Riker, William H. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74(2): 432–46.Google Scholar

Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76(4): 753–66.Google Scholar

Riker, William H. 1984. “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice.” American Political Science Review 78(1) (March): 1–16.Google Scholar

Robinson, David T. and Stuart, Toby E.. 2006. “Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(1): 242–73.Google Scholar

Robinson, J. A. and Torvik, R.. 2011. “Institutional Comparative Statics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 17106.Google Scholar

Rodrik, Dani, Subramanian, Arvind, and Trebbi, Francesco. 2009. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 9305.Google Scholar

Rothbard, Murray. 1995. Economic Thought before Adam Smith: An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, Volume I. Brookville, VT: Ashgate.Google Scholar

Roubini, N. and Sachs, J. D.. 1989. “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies.” European Economic Review 33 (April): 903–38.Google Scholar

Rourke, Francis E. 1984. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. New York, NY: Harper Collins.Google Scholar

Rowley, Charles K. and Schneider, Friedrich, eds. 2004. The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 2 vols. Boston, MA: Kluwer.Google Scholar

Rubin, Paul H. 2005. “Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges.” In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edited by Ménard, Claude and Shirley, Mary, 205–28. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

Rudalevige, A. 2012. “The Contemporary Presidency: Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 138–60.Google Scholar

Rutherford, Malcolm. 1994. Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Salvador Tamayo, Estefanía. 2014. “The Understanding of Development in Ecuador through Institutions and Beliefs, 1950–2014.” Masters Economics Thesis, Lund University.Google Scholar

Scarrow, Howard A. 1986. “Duverger’s Law, Fusion, and the Decline of American ‘Third’ Parties.” Western Political Quarterly 39(4) (December): 634–47.Google Scholar

Scartascini, C., and Crain, W. M.. 2002. “The Size and Composition of Government Spending in Multi-Party Systems.” SSRN Electronic Journal (April).Google Scholar

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Schenk, Karl-Ernst. 2003. Economic Institutions and Complexity. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Schlag, Pierre. 2015. “How to Do Things with Hohfeld.” Law and Contemporary Problems 78(1–2): 185–234.Google Scholar

Schofield, Norman. 1993. “Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments.” European Journal of Political Research 23: 1–33.Google Scholar

Schofield, Norman 2006. Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Schofield, Norman 2008. The Spatial Model of Politics. London: Routledge.Google Scholar

Schultz, P. Wesley, and Stein, Steven R.. 2009. “Litter in America: National Findings and Recommendations.” Keep America Beautiful.Google Scholar

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers.Google Scholar

Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Segal, Jeffrey A., Cameron, Charles M., and Cover, Albert D.. 1992. “A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations.” American Journal of Political Science 36(1): 96–121.Google Scholar

Segal, Jeffrey A. and Spaeth, H. J.. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

SENPLADES. 2010. “Los nuevos retos de América Latina: Socialismo y Sumak Kawsay” [The new challenges of Latin America: Socialism and Sumak Kawsay]. Quito: SENPLADES.Google Scholar

Shear, Michael D. 2016. “Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Criticizing Donald Trump.” New York Times, July 14.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2008. “Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald A., 1031–49. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2010. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd edn. New York, NY: Norton.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2017. Rule Breaking and Political Imagination. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R.. 1981. “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice.” Public Choice 37(3): 503–19.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.” American Political Science Review 81(1): 85–104.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R. 1995a. “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.” In Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, edited by Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R., 5–35. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry R. eds. 1995b. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Shipan, Charles R. 1997. Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Shirley, Mary M., Wang, Ning, and Claude, Ménard. 2015. “Ronald Coase’s Impact on Economics.” Journal of Institutional Economics 11(2): 227–44.Google Scholar

Shugart, M. and Carey, J.. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Siaroff, A. 2009. Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar

Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar

Simon, Herbert A. 1961. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. 2nd edn. New York, NY: Macmillan.Google Scholar

Simon, Herbert A. 1991. “Organizations and Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2): 25–44.Google Scholar

Skaaning, Svend-Erik. 2010. “Measuring the Rule of Law.” Political Research Quarterly 63(2): 449–60.Google Scholar

Smith, Adam. [1776] 2007. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by S. M. Soares. MetaLibri Digital Library. www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf.Google Scholar

Smith, Henry E. 2000. “Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields.” Journal of Legal Studies 29(1) (January): 131–69.Google Scholar

Smith, J. Allen. 1914. “Effect of State Regulation of Public Utilities upon Municipal Home Rule.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 53: 85–93.Google Scholar

Sobbrio, Francesco. 2011. “Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6(3–4): 235–74.Google Scholar

Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Engerman, Stanley L.. 2000. “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 217–32.Google Scholar

Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3): 355–74.Google Scholar

Spiller, Pablo T. 1990. “Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or ‘Let Them Be Bribed.’” Journal of Law and Economics 33(1): 65–101.Google Scholar

Spiller, Pablo T. and Gely, Rafael. 1992. “Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Relations Decisions, 1949–1988.” Rand Journal of Economics 23: 463–92.Google Scholar

Spiller, Pablo T. and Gely, Rafael 2009. “Strategic Judicial Decision-Making.” Oxford Handbooks Online. www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199208425-e-3.Google Scholar

Spiller, Pablo T. and Liao, Sanny. 2008. “Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups’ Participation in Policy Making: A Selective Survey.” In New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook, edited by Brousseau, Eric and Glachant, Jean-Michel, 307–27. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Starrett, David A. 1972. “Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of Externalities.” Journal of Economic Theory 4(2): 180–99.Google Scholar

Steensgaard, Niels. 1974. The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Stevens, John Paul. 1986. “The Third Branch of Liberty.” University of Miami Law Review 41(2): 277–93.Google Scholar

Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3–21.Google Scholar

Stigler, George J. ed. 1988. Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

Stigler, George J. and Friedland, Claire. 1962. “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity.” Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October): 1–16.Google Scholar

Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1975. “The Theory of ‘Screening,’ Education, and the Distribution of Income.” American Economic Review 65(3): 283–300.Google Scholar

Stromberg, David. 2004. “Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy.” Review of Economic Studies 71: 265–84.Google Scholar

Sunstein, Cass R. 1989. “On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action.” Duke Law Journal 1989(3): 522–37.Google Scholar

Tadelis, Steven and Williamson, Oliver E.. 2013. “Transaction Cost Economics.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Gibbons, Robert and Roberts, John, 159–89. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Tridimas, George. 2005. “Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government.” Constitutional Political Economy 16: 5–30.Google Scholar

Tullock, Gordon. 1965. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.Google Scholar

Tullock, Gordon 1967. Toward a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar

Tullock, Gordon and Brennan, Geoffrey. 1981. “Why So Much Stability.” Public Choice 37(2): 189–204.Google Scholar

Tushnet, Mark V. 2003. Slave Law in the American South: State v. Mann in History and Literature. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.Google Scholar

Umbeck, John. 1981. “Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights.” Economic Inquiry 19(1): 38–59.Google Scholar

US Department of Agriculture. 1936. Agricultural Statistics 1936. Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture.Google Scholar

van der Schyff, Gerhard. 2010. Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Review of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and South Africa. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar

van Zandt, David E. 1993. “The Lessons of the Lighthouse: ‘Government’ or ‘Private’ Provision of Goods.” Journal of Legal Studies 22(1): 47–72.Google Scholar

Viscusi, Kip W., Harrington, Joseph E. Jr., and Vernon, John M.. 2005. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Voigt, Stefan. 1997. “Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey.” Public Choice 90(1/4): 11–53.Google Scholar

Voigt, Stefan 2008. “The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Cross-Country Evidence.” European Journal of Law and Economics 25(2) (April): 95–123.Google Scholar

Voigt, Stefan 2011. “Positive Constitutional Economics II – A Survey of Recent Developments.” Public Choice 146(1–2) (January): 205–56.Google Scholar

Volden, C. 2002. “A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 111–33.Google Scholar

Wallis, John Joseph. 2018a. “Leviathan Denied: Rules, Governments, and Social Dynamics.” Unpublished book manuscript.Google Scholar

Wallis, John Joseph. 2018b. “What Institutions Are: The Difference between Norms and Institutions, Rules and Enforcement.” Working Paper, University of Maryland, January.Google Scholar

Weingast, Barry R. 1979. “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms.” American Journal of Political Science 23(2) (May): 245–62.Google Scholar

Weingast, Barry R. 1998. “Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy.” In Analytic Narratives, edited by Bates, Robert et al., 148–93. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar