2 - Behaviourism
from Part I - Context
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
Summary
Psychological Behaviourism
Philosophical behaviourism is a view about the nature of the mind, the concept of mind and mental predicates. It may remain neutral about how the science of the mind should be pursued. Psychological behaviourism on the other hand is committed to the methodological claim that the scientific study of animal psychology should be limited to the scientific study of animal behaviour. So it has been common for philosophers to make a complete separation between the two kinds of behaviourism.
This has partly been in an attempt to dissociate behaviourism from the deeply unpopular views of hard-line psychological behaviourists like B. F. Skinner. Skinner has become a kind of Dr Frankenstein in the popular imagination. This image is exemplified by his use of the Skinner Box for imprisoning pigeons and experimenting on them. Lights flash, bells ring, and the birds peck levers and get pellets of food delivered in reward. Sometimes they get electric shocks instead. By observing how the pigeons' behaviour developed in these boxes, Skinner thought he had come to understand the basic process of all animal learning, including human learning – that of conditioning.
Although philosophical behaviourism makes no such claim about the role of conditioning, philosophical and psychological behaviourism cannot be entirely separated. For although psychological behaviourism may ostensibly be about the science of psychology, its fundamental premise is that claims about minds (or at any rate claims that purport to be about minds) are really claims about behaviour. This is the fundamental assumption of philosophical behaviourism too.
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- The Inner Life of a Rational AgentIn Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism, pp. 21 - 36Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2006