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6 - Concept Calculus: Much Better Than

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2011

Harvey M. Friedman
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University, United States
Michael Heller
Affiliation:
Pontifical University of John Paul II
W. Hugh Woodin
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

My contribution to this volume is the initial publication in concept calculus. This is the term I used to describe a new development that seeks to connect two structures that are normally thought to have little or no connection.

On the one hand, there is ordinary commonsense thinking. Generally speaking, ordinary commonsense thinking is rather unstructured and has little in the way of the careful exactness that drives science.

Nevertheless, philosophers have long been committed to taking many aspects of ordinary commonsense thinking at face value and to searching and analyzing fundamental principles. For instance, consider the development of ordinary language philosophy (see, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinary_language_philosophy).

On the other hand, there is mathematical thinking. Here there has been a tremendously successful and productive development in laying out and analyzing fundamental principles.

Several different approaches apply to the analysis of ordinary mathematical thinking. The most well known and well studied of these are in terms of set theory. Others include class theory and category theory.

It has been established that all of these different approaches to the analysis of ordinary mathematical thinking result in foundational systems that are, in an appropriate and precise sense, equivalent. In other words, each one can be interpreted in all of the others.

In concept calculus, we seek foundational systems for commonsense concepts, as opposed to mathematical concepts. The fundamental principles that are uncovered are plausible or compelling to varying extents. We are feeling our way in identifying fundamental principles, at this very early stage.

Type
Chapter
Information
Infinity
New Research Frontiers
, pp. 130 - 164
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

Enayat, A., Schmerl, J., and Visser, A. 2008. ω-models of finite set theory, www.phil.uu.nl/preprints/lgps/, #266, Logic Group Preprint Series, Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University.
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Friedman, H. 2007. Interpretations, according to Tarski. Lecture 1 of the 19th Annual Tarski Lectures, Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley. www.math.ohio-state.edu/%7Efriedman/manuscripts.html, #60.
Friedman, H. In press. Forty years on his shoulders. In Horizons of Truth: Gödel Centenary. Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, H. In preparation. Concept Calculus, www.math.ohio-state.edu/%7Efriedman/manuscripts.html.
Friedman, H., and Visser, A. In preparation. Interpretations between Theories.
Hovda, P. 2009. What is classical mereology?Journal of Philosophical Logic 38: 55–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaye, R., and Wong, T. L. 2007. On interpretations of arithmetic and set theory. The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (4): 497–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simons, P. 1987. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Varzi, A. C. 2007. Spatial reasoning and ontology: Parts, wholes, and locations. In Handbook of Spatial Logics, Aiello, M. et al. (eds.) pp. 945–1038. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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