Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The U.S. imperial state: theory and historical setting
- 2 The United States in Cuba 1952–1958: policymaking and capitalist interests
- 3 The United States in Cuba 1959–1961: national-social revolution, state transformation, and the limits of imperial power
- 4 The United States against Cuba 1961-1968: politics of confrontation in Latin America
- 5 The United States against Cuba 1961–1968: politics of global economic blockade
- 6 The United States against Cuba 1968–1980: intransigent policymaking and its consequences
- 7 The U.S. imperial state: some final insights
- Epilogue. The Reagan administration and Cuba: the revival of vendetta politics 1981–1986
- Appendix 1 The impact and effectiveness of the U.S. global economic blockade on Cuban development
- Appendix 2 Tables
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - The United States in Cuba 1952–1958: policymaking and capitalist interests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The U.S. imperial state: theory and historical setting
- 2 The United States in Cuba 1952–1958: policymaking and capitalist interests
- 3 The United States in Cuba 1959–1961: national-social revolution, state transformation, and the limits of imperial power
- 4 The United States against Cuba 1961-1968: politics of confrontation in Latin America
- 5 The United States against Cuba 1961–1968: politics of global economic blockade
- 6 The United States against Cuba 1968–1980: intransigent policymaking and its consequences
- 7 The U.S. imperial state: some final insights
- Epilogue. The Reagan administration and Cuba: the revival of vendetta politics 1981–1986
- Appendix 1 The impact and effectiveness of the U.S. global economic blockade on Cuban development
- Appendix 2 Tables
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The regional context
United States policy in Latin America between 1945 and 1958 was based upon what David Green called the principle of “a closed hemisphere in an Open World” Washington's desire for political dominance over the region led it both to oppose the intrusion of fascism and other ideologies and to respond antagonistically to governments promoting independent foreign policies and development programs that constrained foreign capital. The American objective was expressed by deepening the region's dependence in the areas of trade, finance, and investment on U.S. public agencies, multinational corporations, and export-importers, and via agreements wrested from regimes for the production and transfer to the United States of certain “raw and semi-processed materials.” The major aim of U.S. participation in the Chapultepec conference in February 1945, which ostensibly gathered to discuss inter-American economic relationships, was to oppose Peronist nationalism. Accordingly, the American delegation resisted tariff protection, supported increased foreign capital participation in local enterprises, and denounced economic nationalism and the emergence of statist regimes.
The rationale for extending the “closed hemisphere” concept to cover military relations was outlined cogently by U.S. Secretary of War Robert Patterson in a statement supporting congressional passage of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act in 1947:
…I feel obliged to re-emphasize the advantage to hemisphere security by standardizing the military establishments of the American Republics as to equipment, training, and organization. Of these, the provision of United States equipment is the keystone since United States methods of training and organization must inevitably follow its adoption along with the far-reaching concomitant benefits of permanent United States military missions and the continued flow of Latin American officers through our service schools. […]
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Imperial State and RevolutionThe United States and Cuba, 1952–1986, pp. 40 - 71Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1988