Early imitation is typically associated with cognitive and social-communicative functions (Uzgiris 1981, 1999; see also Nadel & Butterworth, 1999). The cognitive function of infant imitation is put forth in theories such as Piaget's (1962) who considers imitation as a central process by which infants develop an ability to function symbolically, performing actions (signifier) as standing for the action of someone else (signified). The cognitive aspect of early imitation is also emphasized in current research and theories suggesting that via imitation, infants pick up information about the identity of others and might express a sense of others as equivalent to themselves. Accordingly, from an early age infants take a “like-me stance” (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994, 1999; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).

Early imitation is also discussed in relation to its potential social-communicative function, a way by which infants maintain contact and social-proximity with others (Uzgiris, 1981, 1999). The early propensity to imitate would not only be the expression of cognitive capacities, but also a means for infants to create interpersonal contacts and establish grounds for shared experiences, hence to develop intersubjectivity. In support of this contention, infants are shown for example to repeat an imitative act in the presence of the experimenter who modeled the action, for no other apparent reason than the maintenance of dialogic interaction (Killen & Uzgiris, 1981).

In this chapter, I argue that aside from a cognitive and social-communicative function, early imitation serves an ego function.