Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- MAP 1 The American Eastern Seaboard, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea
- MAP 2 Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River
- Abbreviations
- Note on US Dollar/Pound Sterling Conversion Rates
- Foreword
- Preface
- INTRODUCTION
- 1 CONVOYS AND BLOCKADES: The Evolution of Maritime Economic Warfare
- 2 WAR AT A DISTANCE: Constraints and Solutions
- 3 FROM BUSINESS PARTNERS TO ENEMIES: Britain and the United States before 1812
- 4 THE UNITED STATES BLOCKADED: Admiral Warren's ‘United Command’, August 1812–April 1814
- 5 BLOCKADES AND BLUNDERS: Vice-Admiral Cochrane's Command, April 1814–February 1815
- 6 TRADE AND WAR: The Effects of Warren's Blockades, August 1812–April 1814
- 7 CAPITAL AND CREDIT: The Impact of the Final Phase
- 8 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
- EPILOGUE
- Appendix A: Maritime Tables
- Appendix B: Economic History Tables
- Notes to the Chapters
- Bibliography
- Index
INTRODUCTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- MAP 1 The American Eastern Seaboard, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea
- MAP 2 Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River
- Abbreviations
- Note on US Dollar/Pound Sterling Conversion Rates
- Foreword
- Preface
- INTRODUCTION
- 1 CONVOYS AND BLOCKADES: The Evolution of Maritime Economic Warfare
- 2 WAR AT A DISTANCE: Constraints and Solutions
- 3 FROM BUSINESS PARTNERS TO ENEMIES: Britain and the United States before 1812
- 4 THE UNITED STATES BLOCKADED: Admiral Warren's ‘United Command’, August 1812–April 1814
- 5 BLOCKADES AND BLUNDERS: Vice-Admiral Cochrane's Command, April 1814–February 1815
- 6 TRADE AND WAR: The Effects of Warren's Blockades, August 1812–April 1814
- 7 CAPITAL AND CREDIT: The Impact of the Final Phase
- 8 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
- EPILOGUE
- Appendix A: Maritime Tables
- Appendix B: Economic History Tables
- Notes to the Chapters
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
[T]he noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts [was] cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes in which it does not itself appear or appears only in the background, and striking blows only at rare intervals.
CAREFUL STUDY OF THE WAR OF 1812 between Britain and the United States began almost as soon as conflict ended in February 1815. Described then in America as a ‘second war of independence’, the war remains both important and controversial. From the outset, each study tended to concentrate on particular aspects of the war. In 1817 William James, a British lawyer-turned-historian, was meticulous in refuting some of the more extravagant contemporary American naval claims in his Full and Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War. Since then, almost every separate action has been minutely dissected and its naval and military significance analysed at length.
Alfred Mahan's Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, published in Boston in 1905, also dealt in detail with the war's early single-ship actions, which caught the public imagination then and since. Mahan's description and evaluation of British maritime blockades against the United States was part of his argument in favour of ‘a naval force adequate to the protection of our commerce’. He attributed the bankruptcy of New England merchants to British maritime blockade, but stopped short of admitting the eventual insolvency of the American government.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How Britain Won the War of 1812The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815, pp. 1 - 5Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2011